[AusNOG] More legislative interventions

Wed Apr 10 10:56:12 EST 2019

We need to differentiate between what would meet industry standards of best
practice, and the rather lower threshold of falling into the category of
"recklessness". So company directors can either ask the question now, what
threshold implementation clears the "recklessness" bar, or be faced with
the same question before a court.

Now I would say that for instance, if the eSecurity Director posts the CRC
of a file as being "abhorrent violent" content, and your company doesn't
expeditiously take down that material, expect problems down the pike. I
doubt a CRC check alone is sufficient. I'd say a fingerprinting system to
match altered copies of the subject file should be implemented. It doesn't
have to work in all cases. However it probably should be able to be shown
it catches the majority of unsophisticated attempts to circumvent the
content filter. Anything less, and company directors haven't done their due
diligence.

I am not a lawyer. This is not expert advice.

Kind regards

Paul Wilkins

On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 09:32, Bruce Forster <bruce at tubes.net.au> wrote:

> I'd argue that whenever gov.co sticks its fingers into tech on any level
> the outcome is never as expected...
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 8:06 AM Nick Stallman <nick at agentpoint.com> wrote:
>
>> The other part is that all the politicians keep whining about the
>> dominance of Facebook and Google.
>> Then they pass a law which effectively cements their dominance in place.
>>
>> Facebook and Google are at a size where they can actually put some
>> serious money and effort in to these kinds of video analysis.
>> Sure it still sucks, but they can at least attempt to do it.
>>
>> If I had a novel idea involving live streaming, I make a start up and it
>> becomes popular.
>> But a small start up in Australia has no hope of approaching the types
>> of analysis that Facebook and Google can do.
>>
>> The politicians just use the same arguments they use with cryptography.
>> "We pass the laws, you guys are smart and have algorithms. We are sure
>> you can figure out how to comply."
>>
>> What the government should be doing is producing the video analysis
>> algorithms themselves.
>> Then the law can state that online companies must use their model to be
>> compliant with the law.
>> The responsibility then falls on to the government, startups are on
>> equal footing as the dominant companies and complying is relatively easy.
>>
>> But that solution is hard (arguably unsolvable at the moment) and when
>> the model inevitably fails the government wouldn't be able to make a
>> bogeyman out of the big tech companies.
>>
>> On 9/4/19 9:33 pm, andy at coastalaudio.com.au wrote:
>> > Let's see this wonderful "fingerprint" Paul...
>> >
>> > Video fingerprinting is used for copyright purposes and is of no use in
>> > detecting "suspect" videos.
>> > The AI algorithm required to do this would require a lot of processing
>> > power.
>> > Just how is a provider supposed to finance the development of said
>> > algorithm...?
>> > And then apply it in real time across an entire network?
>> > The computational power required would be enormous, thus YouTube's
>> abject
>> > failure in this area.
>> >
>> > Open NSFW is an open source neural network that struggles with static
>> > images...
>> > How is a provider supposed to monitor video in real time?
>> >
>> > An interesting Open NSFW talk here -
>> > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02Bmt7tksvM
>> >
>> > Andy
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: AusNOG <ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net> On Behalf Of Peter Fern
>> > Sent: Tuesday, 9 April 2019 2:30 PM
>> > To: ausnog at lists.ausnog.net
>> > Subject: Re: [AusNOG] More legislative interventions
>> >
>> > On 9/4/19 2:22 pm, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>> >> 2 - Ensure you have in place a mechanism to match electronic
>> >> fingerprints of material similar to anything identified in a eSafety
>> >> Commissioner's notice.
>> >>
>> >> By the by, without a mechanism for the eSafety Commissioner to match
>> >> content (a common mechanism for electronic fingerprinting material
>> >> across hosting providers), the eSafety Commissioner will find
>> >> themselves playing whack a mole chasing content specific to each
>> >> hosting provider.
>> > What do you think that looks like, exactly? You've brought up this
>> magical
>> > fingerprint technology multiple times, and been rebuffed multiple times,
>> > with no response. I think it's irresponsible to suggest that this is an
>> easy
>> > solve.
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>> --
>> Nick Stallman
>> Technical Director
>> Email   nick at agentpoint.com <mailto:nick at agentpoint.com>
>> Phone   02 8039 6820 <tel:0280396820>
>> Website         www.agentpoint.com.au <https://www.agentpoint.com.au/>
>>
>>
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>
>
> --
> Regards,
>
> Bruce
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