[AusNOG] Assistance and Access Bill moves to PJCIS

Paul Wilkins paulwilkins369 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 27 11:34:46 EST 2018


To my mind, treatment by Attorney General's of the consultation process
holds the public and industry in contempt. With under 2 weeks between
closure of submissions and transfer to PJCIS, how could they have even read
all submissions, let alone given them due consideration? The bearest of
amendments fiddling at the edges serves only so that Dutton can tell the
House industry has been consulted, before steamrolling an ill prepared Bill
through the House.

The Guardian article suggests Labor support is iffy. But I'm not even
convinced Liberals are behind this, the push seems to emanate from Attorney
General's.

For anyone with serious concerns, looking to delay passage of the Bill to
give sufficient time to allow development of a considered well designed
framework, with a workable and proportionate regime, I'd be writing to
local members and pointing out where the Bill is premature, deficient and
badly framed.

Kind regards

Paul Wilkins


On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 11:07, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns
>
> Submission by Australian Information Industry Association
> <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf>
>
>
> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <pbrooks-ausnog at layer10.com.au>
> wrote:
>
>> I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions
>> to submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only.
>> *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.*
>>
>> There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to
>> be called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would
>> prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the
>> Government's need for an accelerated process is clear.
>>
>> All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now,
>> so that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all
>> the witnesses that want to appear and make these points.
>>
>>
>> https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018
>>
>> The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review.
>> Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October
>> 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the
>> Secretariat at TOLAbill at aph.gov.au by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to assist
>> with planning. Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19 October 2018.
>>
>>
>> Please - send an email now to TOLAbill at aph.gov.au to confirm you will
>> (a) make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and
>> then work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent
>> to the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee
>> may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home
>> Affairs..
>>
>> And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if
>> there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue.
>>
>> Paul.
>>
>>
>> On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>>
>> I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill
>> wasn't completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the
>> news cycle around his au pair scrape.
>>
>> Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want
>> these powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new
>> powers would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes.
>>
>> However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and
>> will lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone
>> has their concerns, these are mine:
>>
>> 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and
>> TARs.
>>
>> 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the issuing
>> agencies.
>>
>> Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and
>> instead, have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act
>> as custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data.
>>
>> 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs.
>> Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include:
>> Cost, security management, risk management, business management
>> processes, disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy
>> Act 1988.
>>
>> 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to
>> coerce unlawful access/disclosure.
>>
>> 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case for
>> these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I imagine
>> they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" because
>> (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants? It'd be
>> good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and physical
>> warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one thing to
>> execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law Enforcement
>> entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law Enforcement
>> go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates to your
>> phone.
>>
>> 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber
>> stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used,
>> whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will
>> of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of government
>> leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public interest.
>> There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public
>> interest, are not always the same thing.
>>
>> 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to
>> enforce silence as to the  existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this
>> power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should
>> rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data warrants.
>>
>> 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to
>> themselves for 48 hours.
>>
>> 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any
>> computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending
>> to the internet and anything that connects to the internet.
>>
>> 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict
>> themselves to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't
>> extend to compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed
>> to extract data from the target computer.
>>
>> Kind regards
>>
>> Paul Wilkins
>>
>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <trs80 at ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>>>
>>> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or
>>> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter
>>> > law.
>>>
>>> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention.
>>> The
>>> Australian government removed references to the convention from the laws
>>> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this
>>> great
>>> quote:
>>>
>>> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian
>>> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international
>>> law.”
>>>
>>>
>>> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/
>>> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html
>>> p462
>>>
>>> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless
>>> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the
>>> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will.
>>>
>>> --
>>> # TRS-80              trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au #/ "Otherwise Bub here
>>> will do \
>>> # UCC Wheel Member     http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #|  what squirrels do
>>> best     |
>>> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing          ]|  -- Collect and hide
>>> your   |
>>> [  software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\  nuts." -- Acid
>>> Reflux #231 /
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>>
>>
>>
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