[AusNOG] Assistance and Access Bill moves to PJCIS

Thu Sep 27 11:07:17 EST 2018

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns

Submission by Australian Information Industry Association
<https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf>

On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <pbrooks-ausnog at layer10.com.au>
wrote:

> I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions to
> submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only.
> *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.*
>
> There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to be
> called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would
> prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the
> Government's need for an accelerated process is clear.
>
> All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now, so
> that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all
> the witnesses that want to appear and make these points.
>
>
> https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018
>
> The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review.
> Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October
> 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the Secretariat
> at TOLAbill at aph.gov.au by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to assist with
> planning. Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19 October 2018.
>
>
> Please - send an email now to TOLAbill at aph.gov.au to confirm you will (a)
> make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and then
> work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent to
> the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee
> may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home
> Affairs..
>
> And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if
> there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue.
>
> Paul.
>
>
> On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>
> I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill wasn't
> completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the news
> cycle around his au pair scrape.
>
> Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want these
> powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new powers
> would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes.
>
> However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and
> will lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone
> has their concerns, these are mine:
>
> 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and
> TARs.
>
> 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the issuing
> agencies.
>
> Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and instead,
> have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act as
> custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data.
>
> 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs.
> Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include:
> Cost, security management, risk management, business management processes,
> disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy Act 1988.
>
> 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to
> coerce unlawful access/disclosure.
>
> 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case for
> these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I imagine
> they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act" because
> (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants? It'd be
> good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and physical
> warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one thing to
> execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law Enforcement
> entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law Enforcement
> go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates to your
> phone.
>
> 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber
> stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used,
> whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will
> of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of government
> leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public interest.
> There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public
> interest, are not always the same thing.
>
> 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to
> enforce silence as to the  existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this
> power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should
> rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data warrants.
>
> 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to
> themselves for 48 hours.
>
> 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any
> computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending
> to the internet and anything that connects to the internet.
>
> 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict themselves
> to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't extend to
> compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed to extract
> data from the target computer.
>
> Kind regards
>
> Paul Wilkins
>
> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <trs80 at ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>>
>> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or
>> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter
>> > law.
>>
>> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention.
>> The
>> Australian government removed references to the convention from the laws
>> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this great
>> quote:
>>
>> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian
>> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international law.”
>>
>>
>> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/
>> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html
>> p462
>>
>> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless
>> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the
>> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will.
>>
>> --
>> # TRS-80              trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au #/ "Otherwise Bub here
>> will do \
>> # UCC Wheel Member     http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #|  what squirrels do
>> best     |
>> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing          ]|  -- Collect and hide
>> your   |
>> [  software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\  nuts." -- Acid Reflux
>> #231 /
>
>
>
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