[AusNOG] Assistance and Access Bill moves to PJCIS

Sat Nov 24 17:48:42 EST 2018

Just this moment submitted my supplementary submission to PJCIS, the most
important point being that TCNs/TANs look to be able meet the criteria
under 313(3)c and 280(1)(b) of the Telecommunications Act 1997, that would
allow Law Enforcement to demand access to carrier metadata streams. Mass
surveillance may not be the stated purpose of the legislation, but the
drafting certainly seems loose enough for a future government to establish
the machinery of a police state. The arguments are made in full in the
submission for anyone interested.

Now I think that exhausts my sense of civic purpose for the foreseeable
future.

Kind regards

Paul Wilkins

On Sat, 24 Nov 2018 at 12:17, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com> wrote:

> s/Fourth Amendment
>
> On Sat, 24 Nov 2018 at 12:15, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> It's a very good question how, when anyone who knows what they're talking
>> about opposes the Bill
>>  as an effective and reasonable approach to fighting terrorism and
>> serious crime in the context of increasing use of encryption, why is the
>> Home Affairs Department foisting this ill considered and poorly developed
>> Bill on the Nation?
>>
>> I think partly it's cultural cringe. The NSA surveil their citizens, and
>> when ministers attend 5 Eyes conferences, they want to be just as macho.
>> But of course, the NSA have a clue, and they're resourced. It's still
>> dazzling that the NSA could have been in breach of the 1st Amendment for as
>> long as they were. In Australia we don't have a Bill of Rights, because
>> government has always observed the Westminster convention that we'll
>> respect the traditions of democracy - until they choose not to.
>>
>> It's not so important whether those pushing the Bill on us understand the
>> technical consequences. They're taking advice from people they trust.
>> Dutton comes from the Queensland Police, and Hastie, the PJCIS Chairman,
>> was a Dutton supporter in the rolling of Turnbull. It's the mandarins
>> within Home Affairs or the Police who are telling the government this is
>> within their capability. As far as I can see, the few submissions
>> supporting the Bill are from police organisations.
>>
>> I think we're beyond Dutton or Hastie caring if the Bill is good for the
>> nation. They're effectively riding a tiger where they've accused anyone
>> opposing the Bill to be weak on terrorism. So instead of a sensible public
>> discussion of how to enable legal intercept for encrypted communications,
>> we're getting the Liberal Trumpists using the Bill as a blunt object to
>> wedge Labor on terrorism and that's all that matters.
>>
>> Kind regards
>>
>> Paul Wilkins
>>
>>
>> On Fri, 23 Nov 2018 at 17:21, Mark Smith <markzzzsmith at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri., 23 Nov. 2018, 16:46 Robert Hudson <hudrob at gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, 23 Nov 2018 at 14:47, Paul Brooks <
>>>> pbrooks-ausnog at layer10.com.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 23/11/2018 11:37 AM, Alex Samad wrote:
>>>>> > Wondering what the implications of this bill and the recent China
>>>>> was stealing our
>>>>> > traffic....
>>>>> >
>>>>> > So in theory could china steal / sniff our traffic and because of
>>>>> these weakening of
>>>>> > encryption allow china to snope on our stuff
>>>>> >
>>>>> > A
>>>>> In theory no - this bill doesn't weaken encryption, and explicitly
>>>>> doesn't allow any
>>>>> changes that would weaken encryption.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They say that - but I don't believe them.  I don't think they even
>>>> understand what they're suggesting (or if they do understand, they're
>>>> relying on others not understanding, or not caring).
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This bill seeks to bypass encryption entirely by giving the agencies
>>>>> easier access to
>>>>> get into devices and the back-end databases of apps and websites, to
>>>>> see what is
>>>>> stored in there -bypassing unlock codes, PINS, thumbprint readers etc
>>>>> on devices for
>>>>> example. So for traffic being sniffed 'in the middle' the information
>>>>> is still
>>>>> sent/received as fully encrypted - and man-in-the-middle snooper won't
>>>>> see anything.
>>>>> But if the authorities get hold of your phone or PC, they'll have
>>>>> easier access to
>>>>> look into your sent/received message stores and read whats in there,
>>>>> which is stored
>>>>> in your device un-encrypted.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The tools the authorities have access to will invariably fall into the
>>>> hands of others.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Or be abused by those who have official access to them.
>>>
>>>
>>> "Queensland in court fight with domestic violence victim whose details
>>> leaked by policeman"
>>>
>>> https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/aug/21/queensland-in-court-fight-with-domestic-violence-victim-whose-details-leaked-by-policeman
>>>
>>>
>>> "NSA SEXINT IS THE ABUSE YOU’VE ALL BEEN WAITING FOR"
>>>
>>> http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/11/nsa-sexint-abuse-you
>>> ’ve-all-been-waiting
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In practice, if they balls-up the change request given to the device
>>>>> manufacturer or
>>>>> app/website developer, anything could happen.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yep.  Aside from the direct ramifications, it's the indirect and
>>>> unintended consequences that REALLY have the potential to be damaging.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> P.
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>> AusNOG at lists.ausnog.net
>>>>> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
>>>>>
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>>
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