[AusNOG] FYI: MANRS Project - Fixing the Internet's routing security is urgent and requires collaboration

[Paul Wilkins]

Paul,
You've misread. What I'm proposing is mandatory source IP verification for
access providers. Submarine cables don't qualify. It does however limit the
impact of any DDOS to those originating offshore, and the restricted
bandwidth available on the cable.

Kind regards

Paul Wilkins

On 29 February 2016 at 16:31, Paul Brooks <paul.brooks at tridentsc.com.au>
wrote:

> On 29/02/2016 2:07 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote:
> >
> >
> > We are however in a very unique situation, where all (ok, most) of our
> transnational
> > traffic travels via a very few submarine cables.
> What does this have to do with anything? Do you think submarine cables put
> a FBR on
> each end and do Layer 3 packet checking?
> Yes, there are few cables (talk to me about a new one), but each is split
> up at layer
> 1 and 2 across tens/hundreds/thousands of ISPs, governments and corporates
> - a
> submarine cable operator won't be doing source IP verification on a
> customer's
> wavelength stream of photons.
>
> Paul.
>
>
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