[AusNOG] Assistance and Access Bill moves to PJCIS

Paul Wilkins paulwilkins369 at gmail.com
Thu Sep 27 13:37:50 EST 2018

I stand corrected.

Kind regards

Paul Wilkins

On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 12:40, Narelle Clark <narellec at gmail.com> wrote:

> Wrong agency - it's Home Affairs (Peter Dutton is the minister) not the
> Attorney General's (Christian Porter) department.
> Narelle
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 11:35 AM Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>> To my mind, treatment by Attorney General's of the consultation process
>> holds the public and industry in contempt. With under 2 weeks between
>> closure of submissions and transfer to PJCIS, how could they have even read
>> all submissions, let alone given them due consideration? The bearest of
>> amendments fiddling at the edges serves only so that Dutton can tell the
>> House industry has been consulted, before steamrolling an ill prepared Bill
>> through the House.
>> The Guardian article suggests Labor support is iffy. But I'm not even
>> convinced Liberals are behind this, the push seems to emanate from Attorney
>> General's.
>> For anyone with serious concerns, looking to delay passage of the Bill to
>> give sufficient time to allow development of a considered well designed
>> framework, with a workable and proportionate regime, I'd be writing to
>> local members and pointing out where the Bill is premature, deficient and
>> badly framed.
>> Kind regards
>> Paul Wilkins
>> On Thu, 27 Sep 2018 at 11:07, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/27/australias-spyware-law-could-expose-phones-to-exploitation-business-group-warns
>>> Submission by Australian Information Industry Association
>>> <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/consultations/Documents/australian-information-industry.pdf>
>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 17:58, Paul Brooks <pbrooks-ausnog at layer10.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>> I've heard the PJCIS process will also be rushed. Calls for 'intentions
>>>> to submit/reqests to appear' are open now for a few weeks only.
>>>> *They are planning precisely 1 single day for public hearings. No more.*
>>>> There are three sitting weeks left in the year. There is an election to
>>>> be called next year probably in May, and caretaker conventions which would
>>>> prevent any further work on this bill from sometime in April. so the
>>>> Government's need for an accelerated process is clear.
>>>> All these points below need to be made in submissions to the PJCIS now,
>>>> so that they can easily see they'll need more than 1 day to get through all
>>>> the witnesses that want to appear and make these points.
>>>> https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018
>>>> The Committee is currently accepting submissions to this review.
>>>> Submissions should be provided no later than *12pm, Friday, 12 October
>>>> 2018.* If you intend to make a submission, please contact the
>>>> Secretariat at TOLAbill at aph.gov.au by Tuesday, 2 October 2018 to
>>>> assist with planning. Hearings are expected to be held on Friday, 19
>>>> October 2018.
>>>> Please - send an email now to TOLAbill at aph.gov.au to confirm you will
>>>> (a) make a submission, and (b) wish to appear at the public hearing - and
>>>> then work out what you want to say. Re-sending a submission previously sent
>>>> to the Home Affairs sham consultation would be a good start - the committee
>>>> may not be given the submissions sent in earlier this month to Home
>>>> Affairs..
>>>> And clear your diaries for Friday 19th October - maybe in Canberra if
>>>> there is to be only one day. I'm still waiting on confirmation of venue.
>>>> Paul.
>>>> On 25/09/2018 5:05 PM, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>>>> I'm thinking Dutton's decision to push ahead with an ill drawn bill
>>>> wasn't completely isolated from his and the government's need to change the
>>>> news cycle around his au pair scrape.
>>>> Which is not to say the cops don't have active activations they want
>>>> these powers for, and as soon as possible. A big bust with Dutton's new
>>>> powers would be a shot in the arm for the government's fortunes.
>>>> However, the Bill doesn't deserve to pass, because it's not ready, and
>>>> will lead to unhappy outcomes, particularly for service providers. Everyone
>>>> has their concerns, these are mine:
>>>> 1 - The multiplicity of agencies and agents who can authorise TANs and
>>>> TARs.
>>>> 1a - Warrant data and service provider data will reside with the
>>>> issuing agencies.
>>>> Hence, the government needs to reconsider the whole approach, and
>>>> instead, have one agency act as a clearing house for TCN/TAN/TARs, and act
>>>> as custodian of warrant data and service provider confidential data.
>>>> 2 - The lack of civil appeal process against TCN/TAN/TARs.
>>>> Grounds for appeal to either refuse or delay assistance should include:
>>>> Cost, security management, risk management, business management
>>>> processes, disruption to business, disparity of TCN/TAN/TAR with Privacy
>>>> Act 1988.
>>>> 2a - The real possibility TAN/TARs will be used by Law Enforcement to
>>>> coerce unlawful access/disclosure.
>>>> 3 - The low bar required to issue TCN/TAN/TARs. The government's case
>>>> for these powers is serious crime and terrorism. I don't know, but I
>>>> imagine they settled for "serious crime as defined under the Crimes Act"
>>>> because (again I'm guessing) that's the standard for physical warrants?
>>>> It'd be good to be clear as to this point, because cyber warrants and
>>>> physical warrants are, I think we'll agree, different in kind. It's one
>>>> thing to execute a physical warrant, which means you have to give Law
>>>> Enforcement entry, but I feel 2 years sets the bar a little low to let Law
>>>> Enforcement go snooping about a data centre, or pushing bootloader updates
>>>> to your phone.
>>>> 4 - The lack of accountability. The reporting requirements are a rubber
>>>> stamp, and leave the public none the wiser how these powers are being used,
>>>> whether they're successful, and to what ends they're exercised. They will
>>>> of course be used by the AFP to pursue journalist sources of government
>>>> leaks. I'm not sure it's clear all leaks are against the public interest.
>>>> There's that problem where the government's interests, and the public
>>>> interest, are not always the same thing.
>>>> 4a - There needs to be specific details as to the use of the power to
>>>> enforce silence as to the  existence of TCN/TAN/TARs. I'm thinking this
>>>> power to suppress shouldn't lie with Law Enforcement at all, but should
>>>> rather form part of the terms of the accompanying computer/data warrants.
>>>> 5 - The Emergency provisions make the police a power answerable to
>>>> themselves for 48 hours.
>>>> 6 - The definition of "computer" which extends to any data held on any
>>>> computer connected on "the same network" - which can be read as extending
>>>> to the internet and anything that connects to the internet.
>>>> 7 - I think the drafting is flawed, where TCN/TAN/TARs restrict
>>>> themselves to a target computer. I think it's arguable the Bill doesn't
>>>> extend to compelling access to ancillary computers/network devices, needed
>>>> to extract data from the target computer.
>>>> Kind regards
>>>> Paul Wilkins
>>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018 at 13:51, <trs80 at ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au> wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>>>>> > Australia is bound under international law against arbitrary or
>>>>> unlawful incursions of the right to privacy. That's black letter
>>>>> > law.
>>>>> We are also bound under international law the 1951 Refugee Convention.
>>>>> The
>>>>> Australian government removed references to the convention from the
>>>>> laws
>>>>> of Australia, so the courts can no longer enforce it. See also this
>>>>> great
>>>>> quote:
>>>>> The Court held that Australian courts are bound to apply Australian
>>>>> statute law “even if that law should violate a rule of international
>>>>> law.”
>>>>> http://ilareporter.org.au/2018/04/australias-disengagement-from-international-refugee-law-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-and-the-doctrine-of-jurisdiction-sophie-capicchiano-young/
>>>>> http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2015/1.html
>>>>> p462
>>>>> So as Mark said, these international "laws" mean nothing here unless
>>>>> enacted by the Australian parliament. And specific bills, like the
>>>>> Assistance and Access Bill can override them at will.
>>>>> --
>>>>> # TRS-80              trs80(a)ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au #/ "Otherwise Bub
>>>>> here will do \
>>>>> # UCC Wheel Member     http://trs80.ucc.asn.au/ #|  what squirrels do
>>>>> best     |
>>>>> [ "There's nobody getting rich writing          ]|  -- Collect and
>>>>> hide your   |
>>>>> [  software that I know of" -- Bill Gates, 1980 ]\  nuts." -- Acid
>>>>> Reflux #231 /
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> --
> Narelle
> narellec at gmail.com
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