[AusNOG] ISDN shutdown 31 May 2022

[Adam Heathcote]

Whilst this is generally true, any SIP provider that isn’t using TLS can
reconstruct the fax image with voip diagnostic software/packet sniffers.
Whilst not an endpoint, the fax does travel through their systems.

I understand that people that work with voip systems are in a “privileged”
position and so policies and procedures would prevent employees from doing
this. It is technically trivial though.



On Thu, 13 Jan 2022 at 6:41 pm, Karl Auer <kauer at biplane.com.au> wrote:

> On Thu, 2022-01-13 at 05:18 +0000, Bradley Amm wrote:
> > Healthcare still loves it as it’s more secure than email apparently.
> > Yes let’s send test results via fax so they can sit in the machine in
> > full view of anyone who goes to them
>
> https://biplane.com.au/blog/?p=530
>
> "Fax is point-to-point. It’s difficult to intercept except at the
> endpoints, interception between the endpoints takes a lot of
> specialised knowledge, and no endpoint is a honeypot. The medium is not
> inherently copyable. Interception at the endpoint takes a significant
> amount of time and requires the physical presence of an attacker. Any
> attacker would be able to access relatively few records. Access would
> be expensive and slow with very high risk of discovery (unless the
> attacker was on staff in which case all communication methods would be
> equally compromised), while for the legitimate user the rate of access
> is easily sufficient. So fax is actually not a bad means of
> transferring private data as long as the fax machines are not located
> in public spaces."
>
> Internet fax would be nice - fax machines with publicly reachable IP
> addresses, protected by SSL, that just print whatever page is sent to
> them. Some form of authentication would be essential of course :-)
>
> Regards, K.
>
> --
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> Karl Auer (kauer at biplane.com.au)
> http://www.biplane.com.au/kauer
>
> GPG fingerprint: 61A0 99A9 8823 3A75 871E 5D90 BADB B237 260C 9C58
> Old fingerprint: 2561 E9EC D868 E73C 8AF1 49CF EE50 4B1D CCA1 5170
>
>
>
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-- 
Adam Heathcote - Systems Development Manager

Sent while on the go, apologies for typos and brevity.
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