[AusNOG] Risks to country and business infrastructure

Andras Toth diosbejgli at gmail.com
Wed Sep 11 22:25:49 EST 2019


The person that got access to their system was not an AWS employee when the
breach happened. The person got access via a misconfigured server/system
that wasn't Amazon's fault.

See the original court case for details:
http://regmedia.co.uk/2019/07/29/capital_one_paige_thompson.pdf

This is the same as saying it's Amazon's fault that people make their S3
buckets public and information gets exposed.

Andras


On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 12:26 PM Chad Kelly <chad at cpkws.com.au> wrote:

> On 9/11/2019 12:00 PM, ausnog-request at lists.ausnog.net wrote:
>
> > When someone questions whether this-or-that was predicted, this seems
> most
> > likely to indicate either the plausibility of the threat, or which side
> of
> > a closed door the questioner was on when the discussions were held.
>
> I'd worry less about people placing explosives in servers and more about
> making sure that proper checks are in place for the people with access
> to information.
>
>
> AWS is a good example of this, they really need to lift their game.
>
> Stuff like the Capital One incident just shouldn't happen and as a
> result of that I am not recommending AWS to any of our customers.
>
> That isn't the only reason, but the fact Capital One are still with AWS
> after that incident scares me a little, if I was them I would of dumped
> them as a vendor immediately.
>
> Basically Datacentres and network operators need to force all staff to
> undergo regular checks particularly when dealing with sensitive info.
>
> I also am aware that the Capital One case isn't Australian, but it is
> still a good example of why providers need to keep an eye on who has
> access to certain info.
>
>
> --
> Chad Kelly
> Manager
> CPK Web Services
> Phone 03 5273 0246
> Web www.cpkws.com.au
>
> _______________________________________________
> AusNOG mailing list
> AusNOG at lists.ausnog.net
> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
>
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