[AusNOG] More legislative interventions

[Paul Wilkins]

https://tineye.com/search/f274c3b49edcca9a6d83994a43629445a5ea5a23/

On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 11:12, Matt Palmer <mpalmer at hezmatt.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:56:12AM +1000, Paul Wilkins wrote:
> > Now I would say that for instance, if the eSecurity Director posts the
> CRC
> > of a file as being "abhorrent violent" content, and your company doesn't
> > expeditiously take down that material, expect problems down the pike. I
> > doubt a CRC check alone is sufficient.
>
> Given that a CRC changes if you modify any bit of the file, and common CRC
> implementations have a space of either 16 or 32 bits (65,536 and ~4 billion
> possible values, respectively), "insufficient" doesn't even begin to
> describe such a scheme.
>
> > I'd say a fingerprinting system to
> > match altered copies of the subject file should be implemented.
>
> Once again with this magical "figerprinting" scheme.  Nothing like what
> you're describing actually exists.  Further, there's no point in each
> company coming up with their own scheme for calculating this magical
> fingerprint, because if the eSecurity Director wants to say "take down
> everything like this fingerprint" they have to use the *same* scheme to
> come
> up with the same fingerprint.
>
> > It doesn't have to work in all cases.
>
> It won't work in *any* case.
>
> > I am not a lawyer. This is not expert advice.
>
> Yes, I think that is quite evident.
>
> - Matt
>
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