[AusNOG] Dutton decryption bill

Martin Hepworth maxsec at gmail.com
Tue Sep 4 19:37:04 EST 2018 

As a Brit working for an Ozzie firm in the UK it's interesting looking at
this that the link talks about 5eyes and not just Australia. We know the
debate is happening in the US and the UK but this is the first time the
5eyes has been explicit mentioned as whole in this context afaik

Martin


On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 10:17, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com> wrote:

> There is one point which I'll be making in my submission which needs to be
> firmly pressed home - that there should not be a diversity of agencies all
> with the power to authorise and execute Assistance/Capability Notices. This
> should be managed through a single agency, that serves as the interface for
> the purposes of the bill, between law enforcement, and service providers.
> This is the only way toensure a standard capability for intelligence
> gathering across agencies, smooth administration of justice and execution
> of Assistance/Capability Notices, and reduces the vulnerability which would
> arise from over a dozen different agencies and their agents all with access
> to service provider networks and services. This one agency should work as a
> clearing house for Assistance/Capability Notices, and for disseminating
> gleaned data to client agencies.
>
> I'd encourage others making submissions to raise the same point.
> Government has clearly not considered this dimension, otherwise the first
> cab off the rank in the bill's phrasing would be to create a new agency, or
> identifying a single agency on which to confer these powers.
>
> Kind regards
>
>
> Paul Wilkins
>
>
> On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 18:02, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> and the stick...
>>
>> "Should governments continue to encounter impediments to lawful access to
>> information necessary to aid the protection of the citizens of our
>> countries, we may pursue technological, enforcement, legislative or other
>> measures to achieve lawful access solutions."
>>
>> On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 17:56, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> "We have agreed to a Statement of Principles on Access to Evidence and
>>> Encryption
>>> <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/national-security/five-country-ministerial-2018/access-evidence-encryption>
>>> that sets out a framework for discussion with industry on resolving the
>>> challenges to lawful access posed by encryption, while respecting human
>>> rights and fundamental freedoms."
>>>
>>> Interesting...
>>>
>>> On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 17:34, Serge Burjak <sburjak at systech.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/national-security/five-country-ministerial-2018
>>>>
>>>> I think it's just been released. Apologies if it's a dupe.
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 4 Sep 2018 at 14:16, Jim Woodward <jim at alwaysnever.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi All,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem with the ‘device malware’ approach is also that if such an
>>>>> approach is used where the intention is to target a single device and the
>>>>> software / hardware vendor screws up and deploys the ‘weakened’ application
>>>>> to many devices instead of one specific device then there is the potential
>>>>> to weaken the security and compromise the privacy of others.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I’m sure there’s some political double talk that would cover this
>>>>> scenario and that the onus would be solely on the vendor for making sure
>>>>> this does not happen, the worry is that this exact scenario is possible,
>>>>> especially if proof of concepts accidently get released into the wild.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The public should be concerned about this for if we end up in a
>>>>> situation where users don’t trust security updates (or updates of any type)
>>>>> then we’re in the same boat as having a purposefully compromised
>>>>> application deployed, we’d have devices with known vulnerabilities with
>>>>> updates turned off which would be arguably more serious as time goes on.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I truly believe the reason this legislation is so vague is that
>>>>> they’re trying to find a solution where no one scenario is without
>>>>> significant risks, they’re trying to hold water in a sieve by tipping more
>>>>> water into it in an effort to fill it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jim.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* AusNOG <ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net> *On Behalf Of *Paul
>>>>> Brooks
>>>>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 4 September 2018 12:05 AM
>>>>> *To:* ausnog at lists.ausnog.net
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [AusNOG] Dutton decryption bill
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 3/09/2018 11:47 AM, Chris Ford wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Paul,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree with you in general as to the point that if we are happy with
>>>>> the premise of the current TIA Act that LEAs should be able to intercept
>>>>> communications with a duly authorised warrant, then extending that to
>>>>> encrypted services seems a reasonable extension to keep up with technology.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> However, the current intercept regime is very difficult if not
>>>>> impossible for a bad actor to exploit. The intercept points are within the
>>>>> Carrier and CSP networks, out of reach of most people. When we move to
>>>>> intercept end-to-end encrypted services you either need to break the
>>>>> encryption (which thankfully does not seem to be the path anybody is
>>>>> proposing), OR, you need to access the clear text at the end point itself.
>>>>> The problem I have with this is that the end point is out in user land,
>>>>> often accessible to anyone on the internet, and now exposed to exploit by
>>>>> bad actors.
>>>>>
>>>>> ..And this is it. The new legislation is NOT about encryption,
>>>>> primarily, despite what we thought before the draft was released.
>>>>> They've explicitly acknowledged they can't 'break' encryption, and do
>>>>> not want to weaken encryption. They want the sent and received message
>>>>> text, stored in the device after/before the encrypted transport.
>>>>>
>>>>> Its actually a 'device malware' bill - a bill to enable general police
>>>>> forces to achieve things that previously only shadowy four-letter agencies
>>>>> could do - implant malware and modify the function of any end-user device,
>>>>> handset, modem, laptop, tablet, printer, connected TV, Amazon Alexa/Google
>>>>> Home/etc. Actually it goes further - rather than implant the malware
>>>>> themselves once they've achieved physical access, this 'device malware'
>>>>> bill enables them to ask nicely for assistance, and then to require, the
>>>>> device suppliers and manufacturers to build and implant the exploit for
>>>>> them. Why should AS** develop an exploit, when they can ask Apple or
>>>>> Netgear or Samsung nicely to develop and install the exploit for them.
>>>>>
>>>>> We've spent decades educating users that the green padlock on a
>>>>> website means something, and that 'IOT devices' such as your average Smart
>>>>> TV might be easily hijacked and be recording and watching the home through
>>>>> its microphone and embedded webcam. This bill makes government-authorised
>>>>> modified firmware with exploits that the network and software industry have
>>>>> spent billions developing virus scanning apps to detect and eradicate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Paul.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Ford | CTO
>>>>>
>>>>> Inabox Group Limited
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ph: + 61 2 8275 6871
>>>>>
>>>>> Mb: +61 401 988 844
>>>>>
>>>>> Em: chris.ford at inaboxgroup.com.au
>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* AusNOG <ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net>
>>>>> <ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net> on behalf of Paul Wilkins
>>>>> <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com> <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, 3 September 2018 11:31:14 AM
>>>>> *To:* AusNOG at lists.ausnog.net
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [AusNOG] Dutton decryption bill
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Bradley,
>>>>>
>>>>> The Common Law has always allowed judicial scrutiny of our privacy.
>>>>> There's always been the right for judicial search warrants to override
>>>>> what's considered one's private domain. I'm supportive of this bill where
>>>>> it extends judicial oversite to the cyber domain, which is a gap that
>>>>> exists only because legislation/common law has lagged behind technology.
>>>>> While at the same time realising that conversations conducted over the
>>>>> internet, even if encrypted, are more properly regarded as public
>>>>> conversations, than say one you might have in your living room. Whether
>>>>> government is going to regulate the internet, the boat has sailed on this
>>>>> long ago. The hard line privacy advocates are simply going to be left out
>>>>> of a conversation democracy needs to have over not whether the internet
>>>>> should be regulated, but how.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What's interesting in this bill is that it goes beyond extending
>>>>> judicial writ, allowing law enforcement emergency powers the right to
>>>>> surveil suspects. This will be authorised by law enforcement, without
>>>>> judicial or governmental oversite. I think this probably goes too far. The
>>>>> best outcome for everyone, to protect privacy, and to empower law
>>>>> enforcement to enforce laws and to protect citizens rights, would be to
>>>>> limit the scope of these new powers to judicial writ.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Kind regards
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Paul Wilkins
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> AusNOG mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> AusNOG at lists.ausnog.net
>>>>>
>>>>> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> AusNOG mailing list
>>>>> AusNOG at lists.ausnog.net
>>>>> http://lists.ausnog.net/mailman/listinfo/ausnog
>>>>>
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-- 
-- 
Martin Hepworth, CISSP
Oxford, UK
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