[AusNOG] Assistance and Access Bill moves to PJCIS

Sun Nov 18 11:45:49 EST 2018

This list was intended to highlight salient concerns, and not as a summary
of the areas of real concern. A more complete summary of concerns would
look more like:

1 - Why is there no judicial oversite of these sweeping police powers?
2 - Scope of powers go beyond terrorism and serious crime when it's not
supposed to.
3 - It supports the establishment of the machinery of mass surveillance
when it's not supposed to.
4 - It weakens the Internet's security, when it's not supposed to.
5 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are necessary
and proportionate to the human right to privacy, unrevokeable per the
Declaration of Human Rights.
6 - Why the deliberate exclusion/incompatibility of the provisions of the
Privacy Act 1988?
7 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are necessary
and proportionate to service providers rights private property,
unrevokeable per the Declaration of Human Rights.
8 - When Police Powers lie with the States, what constitutional head of
power supports the Bill's  scope, without enabling legislation from the
States conferring power? The Constitution confers national security powers,
but the scope of the Bill's police powers exceeds this remit.
9 - Why has the Bill overlooked the obvious alternative of powers spread
across a dozen Law Enforcement Agencies, which is to centralise in one
single agency, providing for greater data security, governance, efficiency,
and accountability.
10 - Why the lack of provisions for accountability for the exercise of
police powers, and checks and balances commensurate to the reach of
sweeping police powers, quite incompatible with the democratic institutions
and traditions of Liberal Democracy?
11 - Why the deliberately curtailed public consultation process and attempt
to ambush both the public and government with this Bill by Dep't Home
Affairs, and representations of public and industry consultations as being
timely and adequate, incompatible with the facts on the public record and
the express concerns of the public, human rights groups, and industry?
12 - Why the absence of recompense for injury to reputation or to service
providers' business, or other injury consequent to police malfeasance or
misfeasance? The Bill's protections are not comprehensive, and where they
make provision, go only as far as to establish lack of liability for
unlawful disclosures.
13 - Why has the government of the day referred this deeply flawed Bill to
the PJCIS, PJCHR, and the SSCSB, for review wasting public time and money,
rather than sending it back to Dep't Home Affairs for a complete overhaul
of it's scope and objectives?

Kind regards

Paul Wilkins

On Sat, 17 Nov 2018 at 13:10, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com> wrote:

> These are all good points.
>
> Home Affairs put up this Bill on the premise it's needed to fight
> terrorism and serious crime in the context of increasing use of encryption.
> Unfortunately, this isn't that bill.
>
> Home Affairs seem rather uninterested in explaining why the remit of this
> Bill goes well beyond this:
>
> 1 - Why is there no judicial oversite of these sweeping police powers?
> 2 - Scope of powers go beyond terrorism and serious crime when it's not
> supposed to.
> 3 - It supports the establishment of the machinery of mass surveillance
> when it's not supposed to.
> 4 - It weakens the Internet's security, when it's not supposed to.
> 5 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are
> necessary and proportionate to the human right to privacy, unrevokeable per
> the Declaration of Human Rights.
> 6 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are
> necessary and proportionate to service providers rights private property,
> unrevokeable per the Declaration of Human Rights.
>
> Unfortunately the way the Bill's drafted, the only limit on the use of the
> Bill's powers is the Dep't Home Affairs.
>
> There's also the very interesting constitutional question, how, when
> Police Powers lie with the States, what constitutional head of power
> supports the Bill's scope, without enabling legislation from the States
> conferring power.
>
> Kind regards
>
> Paul Wilkins
>
> On Sat, 17 Nov 2018 at 10:34, Scott Weeks <surfer at mauigateway.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> It's still Friday here, so I am looking like I'm working
>> while reading these posts as I only have an hour and a
>> half to go before happy hour starts...  ;-)
>>
>>
>> --- christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au wrote:
>> From: Christian Heinrich <christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au>
>>
>> Also
>>
>> https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/are-encrypted-phones-allowing-criminals-to-get-away-with-murder-20150523-gh82gv.html
>> which was 55 devices and 800 clients.
>>
>> Therefore the TAC et al are overkill within the context of the
>> Australian population of 25,000,000+
>> ------------------------------------------------
>>
>> This is a joke.  Right?
>>
>> "...with the devices being used to arrange at least two recent
>> murders and hampered investigations into at least two others."
>>
>> "Phantom Secure...enables messages to be sent and ledgers kept
>> on a device which investigators cannot crack or intercept."
>>
>> "...we are confident we can erode their impact."
>>
>> So if the criminals used postal mail to arrange those crimes
>> and sent ledgers in the postal mail, would they say 'we have
>> to be able to read every postal mail' to erode their impact
>> and ensure safety and national security???  And, 4 crimes
>> happened on a cell phone that's encrypted, so we need to be
>> able to read the contents of 25 million+ cell phones whenever
>> we want.  Just in case.
>>
>>
>> "...representatives from the NSW Police have travelled to
>> BlackBerry's headquarters in Canada in a bid to get advice
>> on how to retrieve information from the encrypted devices."
>>
>> Wow, a free trip to Canada because they can't do phone calls
>> of internet video conferencing?  Something stinks!
>>
>>
>> ======================================
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-04/queensland-fraud-squad-raised-$800k-three-years-project-synergy/8858852
>>
>> "Earlier this year the ABC lodged a right to information
>> application for documents outlining how much money had
>> been raised by Project Synergy.
>>
>> It was refused by Queensland Police."
>>
>> "The QPS has told the ABC that money raised was used for
>> training, cyber-safety programs and fraud awareness."
>>
>> BWAHAHAHAHA!  No we're not going to tell you how we spent
>> tons of money we shouldn't have spent.  (Maybe for fun on
>> the Canada trip?)
>>
>> "...including some questionable items such as wine
>> coolers for a children's program".
>>
>> Further, we're going to get the kids drunk, so they won't
>> either.
>>
>> >:-)   <= evil grin
>>
>> scott
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>>
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>
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