[AusNOG] The Ransomware to come

[John Lindsay]

Watching your server get owned between installing the OS and the patching finishing is always sobering. 

John Lindsay

> On 17 May 2017, at 11:14 pm, Mark Smith <markzzzsmith at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 17 May 2017 10:36 pm, "James Hodgkinson" <yaleman at ricetek.net> wrote:
> > according to the data's provenance
> 
> And how do you verify this provenance? I'm still looking for any more methods of confirming provenance or intent or validity than the ones we already have - which work perfectly well when implemented correctly. The same way your various "planes" would work well *if* implemented correctly. 
> 
> I think you're missing out on a whole world of security that's already in place by being stuck in old world ideas of segmenting traffic for the sake of it.
> 
> Check out Beyond Corp (https://beyondcorp.com/) and the Zero-Trust concepts for something already out there which helps solve what you're trying to do, but doesn't require a whole new networking protocol for the sake of it.
> 
> I think they're giving Google a bit too much credit for this idea of having a perimeterless network- although it is very good to have them as a major production example to point towards.
> 
> First time I came across the idea was in Steve Bellovin's "Distributed Firewalls" from 1999. Entirely changed my perspective on where host security is best done, having deployed network firewalls in around 1996 when they were just coming into the scene.
> 
> https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/distfw.pdf
> 
> Many parts of my 2013 AusNOG presentation were heavily influenced by that paper and its fundamental ideas and observations.
> 
> Look up Steve Bellovin to see how significant it is for him to say the firewalling is best done primarily on the hosts.
> 
> A slightly more recent project related to "perimeterless networks" was the Jericho Forum, founded in 2004.
> 
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jericho_Forum
> 
> Regards,
> Mark.
> 
> 
> 
> James 
> 
> 
>> On Wed, 17 May 2017, at 21:45, Paul Wilkins wrote:
>> Mark,
>> That's a good question and I'm glad you asked.
>> 
>> Once you have a security plane for your data, you can assign profiles according to the data's provenance. Integrate this with your OS security plane, including as an input to your virus scanner, with a view ultimately to preventing control plane actions (like encrypting all your data) that emanate from untrusted or untrustworthy sources from ever being allowed write access outside of the mail spool.
>> The basic problem being, the OS treats a control plane action on a socket the same, regardless of you're logged in from iLo, or coming remote from Ukraine. Firewalls are essentially creating an artificial security plane, but it's a bandaid, and requires you architect your network to channel all your traffic through a chokepoint. If a socket's security profile was part of the API, the profile would follow control actions up the stack, and you'd get end to end security.
>> 
>> Kind regards
>> Paul Wilkins
>> 
>> On 17 May 2017 at 11:12, Mark Newton <newton at atdot.dotat.org> wrote:
>> On May 14, 2017, at 3:34 PM, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> > My feeling is we could see Cisco invent a means of allocating SGT tags by BGP community extended to 64 bits, and some integration of 802.1x to deliver Trustsec to the desktop. The problem being, this implies separate routing tables for different security profiles, being necessarily the case, which is not something ipv6 could be made to support.
>> 
>> How, precisely, would that make any difference to the ransomware attack that sparked your creation of this thread?
>> 
>>   - mark
>> 
>> 
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