[AusNOG] Stopping Amplification Attacks

[Mark Andrews]

In message <CAMmROTLe6fakUgoiYK_vbyxT2-4eM87bMaCyU=Gt6c5W3Odqew at mail.gmail.com>, Paul Wilkins writes:
> There is unfortunately, zero mandatory requirement on ISPs to provide any
> sort of RPF checks. They could have introduced this with the data retention
> requirements, and actually materially improved Australian internet.
> Opportunity missed. Not implementing BCP38 produces the same externality
> effect as pollution, where there is a cost maintaining a clean environment,
> but the cost of polluting is born by some poor Charlie you never have to
> meet. It's a classic market failure, and basically that's one of the
> reasons we recognise the authority of the State, to stop people shoving
> their garbage on other poor Charlie's. So tax payers ought be asking their
> local members, if they're paying tax on their internet, why hasn't the
> State mandated RPF protection?
> 
> This is very much "watch this space" territory, post DDOS on the Australian
> Census, post DDOS UK Euro referendum. Australia is blessed by geography
> regards DDOS, where we could very effectively separate national from
> international traffic, and then mandate BCP38 for ISPs and international
> carriers, through the use of BGP community, ala Team Cymru.
> 
> Kind regards
> 
> Paul Wilkins

Unfortunately RPF only works in limited circumstances.  It is
not a general solution to BCP38 issues.

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka at isc.org