[AusNOG] Consensus from the IETF 88 Technical Plenary - Internet hardening

[Dobbins, Roland]

On Nov 8, 2013, at 3:30 PM, Karl Auer <kauer at biplane.com.au> wrote:

> I'm not clear on why people think that designing encrypted/secure versions of things is a bad thing.

I certainly don't think it's a bad idea.

I think it's a bad idea to conflate security with encryption.

I think it's a bad idea to encrypt things which aren't important to encrypt, in a given context (which varies, of course).

I think it's a bad idea to think that default-on encryption is going to matter a hill of beans when it comes to pervasive governmental surveillance.

> About the only arguments against that I can readily bring to mind are performance and efficiency (and maybe somewhat harder troubleshooting,
> though that's really a tools issue for legitimate participants). 

And security - i.e., detection/classification/traceback.

> Our governments mean us far greater harm - or if our current governments do not, they are working hard to enable it for future governments.

No amount of technology will save us from that, as those of us who remember the crypto wars of the 1990s know, given that all this stuff is simply an end-run around those of us who opposed key escrow.

And mark my words - if encryption-by-default starts to gain traction, key escrow will be back, and there won't be any stopping it.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>

	  Luck is the residue of opportunity and design.

		       -- John Milton