[AusNOG] Telstra agreed to retain [Australian] data for US authorities

[Bevan Slattery]

It's different depending on jurisdiction.  If you are really interested in
this then read Wiltshire Grannis lawyer Kent Bressie's PTC presentation:

http://wiltshiregrannis.com/siteFiles/News/FD460B4960A5941155FD0BEA627C8027.
pdf

As Mark Newton said the process is quite well known.

You meet with Team Telecom (FBI, CIA, NSA, DoD/Military, DHS, State and
Justice Departments).  You need to strike an agreement with them before you
get approval from the FCC for a landing.  Every country has its own controls
over critical infrastructure assets (including change in control/ownership,
operation and management, confidentiality of facilities and location as well
as interception - see page 9 of presentation) and I would suggest that they
aren't too dissimilar to other countries I've seen (see page 6 of
presentation).

It is often a requirement of countries that data that relates to network
configuration, management and metadata relating to traffic that
originates/terminates in their country, stored within their jurisdiction so
that if they need to obtain access they can issue a legal instrument
(usually subpoena) to access said data (as it sits in their jurisdiction).
It's hard/not practical for the US to issue a subpoena in HK to access data.
Same applies the other way to HK issuing subpoenas in the US.

Cheers

[b]



From:  Mark Newton <newton at atdot.dotat.org>
Date:  Sunday, 14 July 2013 7:32 PM
To:  Tony Simenson <td_miles at yahoo.com>
Cc:  "ausnog at lists.ausnog.net" <ausnog at lists.ausnog.net>
Subject:  Re: [AusNOG] Telstra agreed to retain [Australian] data for US
authorities


On 14/07/2013, at 2:15 PM, Tony <td_miles at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Two guys in black suits walk in, look all around the room, then a third suit
> walks in. He puts it to you that you will do what is outlined in the document
> being given to you. You essentially have two choices:
> 
> 1. Comply.
> 2. Politely deline and effectively disconnect Australian Internet from the
> rest of the world.

I put it to you that a choice like that would never be presented, because
the fallout
arising from (2) would be (to coin a phrase) "diplomatically apeshit."

What's more likely is that (2) would be, "Find another landing station
operated by someone
who has already complied."

That'd delay the project, place the installer in a position where they'd
know that landing
parties would have them by the short and curlies on price and access to
cross connects,
and also ensure that the cable would be in a place where the landing party
who had
already complied would be able to intercept the cable in any case.

Sometimes small threats are more effective.

The FCC license grant documents for foreign cables are reasonably open
documents, and
lay out the terms and conditions of the license (including interceptability)
and usually
include the Lat/Long of the cable stations at each end (although sometimes
they
"accidentally" transpose digits, those darn typos!).  Pretty sure that a
little bit of googling
will reveal that REACH wasn't being treated at all uniquely here, and nor
was Australia.


  - mark


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