[AusNOG] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Content Services Gateway Vulnerabilities
Phil Pierotti
phil.pierotti at platformnetworks.net
Thu Jan 27 12:11:10 EST 2011
(sigh)
- spam is evil
- cross-posting emails from one list to another is evil
- subscribing an email list to (insert random vendors notifications list) is evil
Just because they're less-evil than mass murdering babies does not make then a good idea.
If c-nsp is too "noisy" then apply requisite filters to your mail-client subscribed to c-nsp, don't magically arrange for everyone to see postings here that they already read there.
Regards,
Phil Pierotti
Network Operations Manager
Platform Networks
www.platformnetworks.net
ph. 1300 854 678
-----Original Message-----
From: Skeeve Stevens [mailto:Skeeve at eintellego.net]
Sent: Thursday, 27 January 2011 12:07 PM
To: Phil Pierotti; ausnog at ausnog.net
Subject: Re: [AusNOG] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Content Services Gateway Vulnerabilities
Phil,
AusNOG is relatively low volume compared to Cisco-NSP.
...Skeeve
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-----Original Message-----
From: Phil Pierotti <phil.pierotti at platformnetworks.net>
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2011 09:19:31 +1100
To: "ausnog at ausnog.net" <ausnog at ausnog.net>
Subject: Re: [AusNOG] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Content Services
Gateway Vulnerabilities
>Seriously folks, is this *really* necessary?
>
>Are there AUSnogERs out there who do not know about the cisco-nsp mailing
>list?
>
>Regards,
>
>Phil Pierotti
>Network Operations Manager
>Platform Networks
>www.platformnetworks.net
>ph. 1300 854 678
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net
>[mailto:ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net] On Behalf Of Cisco Systems
>Product Security Incident Response Team
>Sent: Thursday, 27 January 2011 2:39 AM
>To: ausnog at ausnog.net
>Cc: psirt at cisco.com
>Subject: [AusNOG] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Content Services Gateway
>Vulnerabilities
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA256
>
>Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Content Services Gateway Vulnerabilities
>
>Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20110126-csg2
>
>http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110126-csg2.shtml
>
>Revision 1.0
>
>For Public Release 2011 January 26 1600 UTC (GMT)
>
>+---------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Summary
>=======
>
>A service policy bypass vulnerability exists in the Cisco Content
>Services Gateway - Second Generation (CSG2), which runs on the
>Cisco Service and Application Module for IP (SAMI). Under certain
>configurations this vulnerability could allow:
>
> * Customers to access sites that would normally match a billing
> policy to be accessed without being charged to the end customer
> * Customers to access sites that would normally be denied based on
> configured restriction policies
>
>Additionally, Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4(24)MD1 on the Cisco
>CSG2 contains two vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a remote,
>unauthenticated attacker to create a denial of service condition that
>prevents traffic from passing through the CSG2. These vulnerabilities
>require only a single content service to be active on the Cisco CSG2 and
>can be exploited via crafted TCP packets. A three-way handshake is not
>required to exploit either of these vulnerabilities.
>
>Workarounds that mitigate these vulnerabilities are not available.
>
>This advisory is posted at
>http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110126-csg2.shtml.
>
>Affected Products
>=================
>
>The service policy bypass vulnerability affects all versions of the
>Cisco IOS Software for the CSG2 prior to the first fixed release, as
>indicated in the "Software Versions and Fixes" section of this advisory.
>
>The two denial of service vulnerabilities only affect Cisco IOS Software
>Release 12.4(24)MD1 on the Cisco CSG2. No other Cisco IOS Software
>releases are affected.
>
>Vulnerable Products
>+------------------
>
>To determine the version of Cisco IOS Software that is running on the
>Cisco CSG2, issue the "show module" command from Cisco IOS Software on
>the switch on which the Cisco CSG2 module is installed to identify what
>modules and sub-modules are installed on the system.
>
>Cisco CSG2 runs on the Cisco Service and Application Module for IP
>(SAMI) card, and is identified in the following example in slot 2 via
>the WS-SVC-SAMI-BB-K9 identification:
>
> C7600#show module
> Mod Ports Card Type Model
>Serial No.
> --- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------
>-----------
> 1 2 Supervisor Engine 720 (Active) WS-SUP720-3BXL
>JAF1226ARQS
> 2 1 SAMI Module (csgk9) WS-SVC-SAMI-BB-K9
>SAD113906P1
> 4 48 CEF720 48 port 10/100/1000mb Ethernet WS-X6748-GE-TX
>SAL1127T6XY
>
> Mod MAC addresses Hw Fw Sw
> Status
> --- ---------------------------------- ------ ------------
>------------ -------
> 1 001e.be6e.a018 to 001e.be6e.a01b 5.6 8.5(2)
>12.2(33)SRC5 Ok
> 2 001d.45f8.f3dc to 001d.45f8.f3e3 2.1 8.7(0.22)FW1
>12.4(2010040 Ok
> 4 001c.587a.ef20 to 001c.587a.ef4f 2.6 12.2(14r)S5
>12.2(33)SRC5 Ok
>
> Mod Sub-Module Model Serial Hw
> Status
> ---- --------------------------- ------------------ -----------
>------- -------
> 1 Policy Feature Card 3 WS-F6K-PFC3BXL JAF1226BNQM 1.8
> Ok
> 1 MSFC3 Daughterboard WS-SUP720 JAF1226BNMC 3.1
> Ok
> 2 SAMI Daughterboard 1 SAMI-DC-BB SAD114400L9 1.1
> Other
> 2 SAMI Daughterboard 2 SAMI-DC-BB SAD114207FU 1.1
> Other
> 4 Centralized Forwarding Card WS-F6700-CFC SAL1029VGFK 2.0
> Ok
>
> Mod Online Diag Status
> ---- -------------------
> 1 Pass
> 2 Pass
> 4 Pass
> C7600#
>
>After locating the correct slot, issue the "session slot <module number>
>processor <3-9>" command to open a console connection to the respective
>Cisco CSG2. Once connected to the Cisco CSG2, perform the "show version"
>command:
>
>The following example shows that the Cisco CSG2 is running software
>Release 12.4(24)MD1:
>
> CSG2#show version
> Cisco IOS Software, SAMI Software (SAMI-CSGK9-M), Version
>12.4(24)MD1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)
> Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
> Copyright (c) 1986-2010 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
> Compiled Wed 07-Apr-10 09:50 by prod_rel_team
>
>
> --- output truncated ---
>
>Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
>+--------------------------------
>
>The Cisco Content Services Gateway - 1st Generation (CSG) is not
>affected by these vulnerabilities.
>
>No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
>vulnerabilities.
>
>Details
>=======
>
>The Cisco Content Services Gateway - Second Generation (CSG2) provides
>intelligent network capabilities such as flexible policy management
>and billing based on deep-packet inspection, as well as subscriber and
>application awareness capabilities that enable mobile operators to
>quickly and easily offer value-added, differentiated services over their
>mobile data networks.
>
>The service policy bypass vulnerability affects configurations that
>allow end users to first access non-accounted or billed sites. After a
>user accesses a non-accounted site, it is possible to access other sites
>that are defined by a billing service policy or to access sites that may
>be blocked by other policies by sending specially crafted HTTP packets.
>This vulnerability only affects HTTP content traffic. HTTPS and other
>traffic types are not affected.
>
>Both denial of service vulnerabilities require only a single content
>service to be active on the Cisco CSG2 and can be exploited via crafted
>TCP packets. A three-way handshake is not required to exploit either of
>these vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are triggered by TCP traffic
>that transits the Cisco CSG2.
>
>The service policy bypass vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID
>CSCtk35917 and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2011-0348.
>
>The denial of service bugs are documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCth17178 and
>Cisco Bug ID CSCth41891 and have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2011-0349 and
>CVE-2011-0350 respectively.
>
>Vulnerability Scoring Details
>=============================
>
>Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
>on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
>this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
>
>CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
>severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
>
>Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
>compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
>vulnerability in individual networks.
>
>Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
>at:
>
>http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
>
>Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
>environmental impact for individual networks at:
>
>http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
>
>
>* CSCtk35917 ("Service Policy Bypass Vulnerability")
>
>CVSS Base Score - 6.4
> Access Vector - Network
> Access Complexity - Low
> Authentication - None
> Confidentiality Impact - Partial
> Integrity Impact - Partial
> Availability Impact - None
>
>CVSS Temporal Score - 5.3
> Exploitability - Functional
> Remediation Level - Official-Fix
> Report Confidence - Confirmed
>
>* CSCth41891/CSCth17178 ("Crafted TCP packet causes CSG2 to restart")
>
>CVSS Base Score - 7.8
> Access Vector - Network
> Access Complexity - Low
> Authentication - None
> Confidentiality Impact - None
> Integrity Impact - None
> Availability Impact - Complete
>
>CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
> Exploitability - Functional
> Remediation Level - Official-Fix
> Report Confidence - Confirmed
>
>
>Impact
>======
>
>Successful exploitation of the service policy bypass can allow customers
>to obtain access to sites that would normally be accounted and billed
>according to the billing policy without the billing policy being
>engaged. Additionally, customers could gain access to URLs that are
>configured in the Cisco CSG2 to be explicitly denied.
>
>Successful exploitation of either denial of service vulnerability could
>result in the Cisco CSG2 reloading or potentially hanging. Due to Cisco
>Bug ID CSCtg50821, the Cisco CSG2 may not automatically recover and
>may require a manual reload of the SAMI card by issuing the "hw-module
>module <x> reset" CLI command from the switch.
>
>Software Versions and Fixes
>===========================
>
>When considering software upgrades, also consult
>http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
>exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
>
>In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
>devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
>hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
>properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
>the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
>maintenance provider for assistance.
>
>Each row of the Cisco IOS Software table (below) names a Cisco IOS
>release train. If a release train is vulnerable, then the earliest
>possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date
>of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed
>Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates
>the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities
>at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given
>train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than
>the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends
>upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the
>"Recommended Releases" column of the table.
>
>+---------------------------------------------------------------+
>| Major | Availability of Repaired Releases |
>| Release | |
>|------------+--------------------------------------------------|
>| Affected | |
>| 12.x-Based | First Fixed Release |
>| Releases | |
>|------------+--------------------------------------------------|
>| 12.0 - | 12.0 through 12.3 based releases are not |
>| 12.3 | affected |
>|------------+--------------------------------------------------|
>| Affected | First Fixed Release |
>| 12.4-Based |--------------------------------------------------|
>| Releases | DoS | Service Policy Bypass |
>| | Vulnerabilities | Vulnerability |
>|------------+------------------+-------------------------------|
>| | All 12.4(11)MD | |
>| | releases are not | All 12.4(11)MD releases are |
>| | affected. | affected. Migrate to a fixed |
>| | | release. |
>| | All 12.4(15)MD | |
>| | releases are not | All 12.4(15)MD releases are |
>| | affected. | affected. Migrate to a fixed |
>| | | release. |
>| | All 12.4(22)MD | |
>| 12.4MD | releases are not | All 12.4(22)MD releases are |
>| | affected. | affected. Migrate to a fixed |
>| | | release. |
>| | Releases prior | |
>| | to 12.4(24)MD1 | All 12.4(24)MD releases prior |
>| | are not | to 12.4(24)MD3 are affected. |
>| | affected. | |
>| | | First fixed in 12.4(24)MD3 |
>| | First fixed in | |
>| | 12.4(24)MD2 | |
>|------------+------------------+-------------------------------|
>| | | All 12.4(22)MDA releases |
>| | | prior to 12.4(22)MDA5 are |
>| | | affected. First fixed in 12.4 |
>| | No releases | (22)MDA5 |
>| 12.4MDA | affected. | |
>| | | All 12.4(24)MDA releases |
>| | | prior to 12.4(24)MDA3 are |
>| | | affected. First fixed in 12.4 |
>| | | (24)MDA3 |
>|------------+--------------------------------------------------|
>| Affected | |
>| 15.X-Based | First Fixed Release |
>| Releases | |
>|------------+--------------------------------------------------|
>| 15.0 - | 15.0 through 15.1 based releases are not |
>| 15.1 | affected |
>+---------------------------------------------------------------+
>
>Cisco IOS Software for the CSG2 is located on Cisco Software Download
>center at the following location: Cisco Interfaces and Modules --> Cisco
>Services Modules --> Cisco Service Application Module for IP.
>
>
>Workarounds
>===========
>
>There are no workarounds for these vulnerabilities.
>
>
>Obtaining Fixed Software
>========================
>
>Cisco has released free software updates that address these
>vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
>their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
>compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
>
>Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
>sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
>or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
>bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
>or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
>http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
>
>Do not contact psirt at cisco.com or security-alert at cisco.com for software
>upgrades.
>
>Customers with Service Contracts
>+-------------------------------
>
>Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
>regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
>should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
>website at http://www.cisco.com.
>
>Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
>+------------------------------------------------
>
>Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
>or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
>as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
>contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
>appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
>
>The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
>customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
>behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
>products and releases, customers should consult with their service
>provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
>is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
>deployed.
>
>Customers without Service Contracts
>+----------------------------------
>
>Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
>contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
>unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
>should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
>Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
>
> * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
> * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
> * e-mail: tac at cisco.com
>
>Customers should have their product serial number available and be
>prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
>free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
>through the TAC.
>
>Refer to
>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
>for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
>numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
>languages.
>
>Exploitation and Public Announcements
>=====================================
>
>The Cisco PSIRT is aware of public announcements of the service billing
>bypass vulnerability on some external blog sites. However the Cisco
>PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerabilities described
>in this advisory.
>
>These vulnerabilities were found by both internal testing and when
>handling customer support calls.
>
>Status of this Notice: FINAL
>============================
>
>THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
>ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
>MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
>INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
>AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
>DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
>
>A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
>the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
>and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
>
>Distribution
>============
>
>This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
>
>http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110126-csg2.shtml
>
>In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
>clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
>e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
>
> * cust-security-announce at cisco.com
> * first-bulletins at lists.first.org
> * bugtraq at securityfocus.com
> * vulnwatch at vulnwatch.org
> * cisco at spot.colorado.edu
> * cisco-nsp at puck.nether.net
> * full-disclosure at lists.grok.org.uk
> * comp.dcom.sys.cisco at newsgate.cisco.com
>
>Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
>worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
>lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
>to check the above URL for any updates.
>
>Revision History
>================
>
>+------------------------------------------------------------+
>| Revision 1.0 | 2011-January-26 | Initial public release. |
>+------------------------------------------------------------+
>
>
>Cisco Security Procedures
>=========================
>
>Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
>in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
>incidents, and registering to receive security information
>from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
>http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy
>.html.
>This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
>Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
>http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
>
>+--------------------------------------------------------------------
>Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
>+--------------------------------------------------------------------
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