[AusNOG] Conroy announcement on filtering

[Mark Newton]

On 15/12/2009, at 7:40 PM, Adrian Chadd wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 15, 2009, Mark Newton wrote:
> 
>> 1.  There's no real problem to solve.
> 
> Sure there is. It's political and social.

Perhaps you can tell us what it is then, because the Government
certainly hasn't. 

Despite two years of asking, they're yet to provide any statement
on what they're trying to achieve.  What's their public policy
goal here?

(bearing in mind that the Enex report's results kill a number of
potential goals, and ACMA's own research kills a bunch more)

>> 2.  Even if there was, there's no public demand to solve it.
> 
> There's _some_ public demand somewhere,

Sure.  ACL and Peter Mancer.  Do you see a groundswell of grass-roots
support for it from anywhere else?

>> 3.  Even if there was, the proposed solution won't work.
> 
> It won't work -well-.

Well hang on, no, it won't work at all.

Look at the circumvention numbers on page 25 of the Enex
report.  Pick virtually any of their 37 circumvention methods
at random and it'll probably work, if it doesn't pick another
one at random and that one will.

The proposed solution is almost completely ineffective for
blocking URLs -- and that's just the means, not the end.  If
you cast the goal in terms of, "Restrict availability of 
inappropriate content on the Internet," then you end up with
bupkis, because anything that's accessed outside of HTTP (including
stuff on banned webservers that also happen to run HTTPS) is
automatically out of scope.

How is it possible to mount even a devils' advocate argument
that says it'll work?  Puh-lease, this audience is smarter than
that.

>> 4.  Even if it did, it's going to be massively expensive and unreliable.
> 
> That is not demonstratably provable.

The report does have a whole section on cost.  It makes the point
that small ISPs will disproportionately shoulder the burden -- Unless
they outsource censorship to a hosted solution.  But the report
has already rubbished outsourced solutions on performance grounds
earlier on, so that's hardly an ideal outcome, is it?


>> 5.  Even if it was perfect, it'll be administered by the same calibre
>>    of public servant that decided "V for Vendetta" was "Prohibited 
>>    Content" on the Internet in Australia, and will be so incompetently
>>    executed that it'll be as useless as a chocolate teapot.
> 
> No argument there. :) But then, the rest of the country is ticking along
> somehow with this level of public servant.

Interesting.  Ask the average ISP what they think of this 
industry's regulatory structure, and the impact it has on their
business.

> IMHO, the list should be at least public, or at least open to audits to
> ensure this kind of crap doesn't occur. Just like what is available with
> the film censorship, no?

Sure, but that isn't on the table.

>> 6.  Even if it was perfectly administered by exemplary public servants,
>>    the blacklist will leak, thereby enhancing the distribution and
>>    visibility of banned material via the well-understood "Streisand
>>    Effect."
> 
> That's a technically solvable problem. I've already explained this to
> the relevant parties who asked.

No it isn't.  Clayton found Oracle attacks were effective against
100% of the censorware systems deployed in the UK, and I can't
think of any reason why they wouldn't be equally effective here.

If the list isn't leaked directly, it'll be reverse engineered by
motivated end-users.

>> 7.  There is absolutely no probability whatsoever that the blacklist
>>    won't leak.
> 
> Again, it isn't possible to prove that, but it certainly is possible to
> distribute the list without distributing the cleartext list.

You're not seriously proposing that a method of perfect, permanent
secrecy will be developed to support this, are you?  Perhaps you
should read a bit more Schneier, and a bit more RISKS.

> The core problem is not the filtering issue, it is why it appeared in the
> first place.

What's your take on that?

I don't think it has anything to do with Fielding's vote because 
he doesn't reliably vote with them anyway, and even if he did there
aren't any more important issues coming down the pike before the 
next election where they need him.

I don't think it has anything to do with protecting children.

I don't think there's any grass-roots call for Internet censorship.

I don't think it's intended to wedge the opposition because there
are enough arguments against it that are perfectly aligned with
their internal ideology that they can represent themselves against
it confidently.

On the other hand, I reckon Rudd is up to his neck in the ACL, who
are in turn up to their necks in Watchdog, for whom this policy creates
an entire new market that didn't previously exist.  But that's just
me following the money, which is probably a damn fool idea that
could never hold any validity.

What's your take on it?

  - mark

--
Mark Newton                               Email:  newton at internode.com.au (W)
Network Engineer                          Email:  newton at atdot.dotat.org  (H)
Internode Pty Ltd                         Desk:   +61-8-82282999
"Network Man" - Anagram of "Mark Newton"  Mobile: +61-416-202-223