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<p class="MsoNormal">Hi What I am saying is that in general you have more chance of humans being negligent and messing up security then you have of someone smuggling explosives into a Datacentre.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">While the AWS security breech wasn’t entirely the companies fault it doesn’t make them look good when they have Capital one splashed all over their website as a case study of how well they are doing.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">AWS really should be recommending their larger customers to go through trained partners.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Regards Chad.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-AU">Chad Kelly <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-AU">Manager <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-AU">CPK Web Services <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-AU">Phone 03 52730246<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-AU">Web https://www.cpkws.com.au<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Andras Toth <diosbejgli@gmail.com> <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, September 11, 2019 10:26 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Chad Kelly <chad@cpkws.com.au><br>
<b>Cc:</b> ausnog@lists.ausnog.net; ausnog-request@lists.ausnog.net<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [AusNOG] Risks to country and business infrastructure<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">The person that got access to their system was not an AWS employee when the breach happened. The person got access via a misconfigured server/system that wasn't Amazon's fault.<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">See the original court case for details: <a href="http://regmedia.co.uk/2019/07/29/capital_one_paige_thompson.pdf">http://regmedia.co.uk/2019/07/29/capital_one_paige_thompson.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">This is the same as saying it's Amazon's fault that people make their S3 buckets public and information gets exposed.<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Andras<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 12:26 PM Chad Kelly <<a href="mailto:chad@cpkws.com.au">chad@cpkws.com.au</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">On 9/11/2019 12:00 PM, <a href="mailto:ausnog-request@lists.ausnog.net" target="_blank">
ausnog-request@lists.ausnog.net</a> wrote:<br>
<br>
> When someone questions whether this-or-that was predicted, this seems most<br>
> likely to indicate either the plausibility of the threat, or which side of<br>
> a closed door the questioner was on when the discussions were held.<br>
<br>
I'd worry less about people placing explosives in servers and more about <br>
making sure that proper checks are in place for the people with access <br>
to information.<br>
<br>
<br>
AWS is a good example of this, they really need to lift their game.<br>
<br>
Stuff like the Capital One incident just shouldn't happen and as a <br>
result of that I am not recommending AWS to any of our customers.<br>
<br>
That isn't the only reason, but the fact Capital One are still with AWS <br>
after that incident scares me a little, if I was them I would of dumped <br>
them as a vendor immediately.<br>
<br>
Basically Datacentres and network operators need to force all staff to <br>
undergo regular checks particularly when dealing with sensitive info.<br>
<br>
I also am aware that the Capital One case isn't Australian, but it is <br>
still a good example of why providers need to keep an eye on who has <br>
access to certain info.<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Chad Kelly<br>
Manager<br>
CPK Web Services<br>
Phone 03 5273 0246<br>
Web <a href="http://www.cpkws.com.au" target="_blank">www.cpkws.com.au</a><br>
<br>
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