<div dir="ltr">Sure, I more meant why is the speculation about the ACCC exiting its regulatory function over the telecommunications industry instead of ACMA, who have arguably a much less useful role to play than the ACCC.</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 5:01 PM, Catchall <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:support@twig.com.au" target="_blank">support@twig.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div>ACMA is definitely needed for the
"other" areas of its interest/control, namely radio.. Without our
airwaves would be rife with interference..<br>
<br>
ACCC is needed for its "other" areas of interest/control, like
stopping monopolies stangle hard working small businesses. <br>
<br>
Not all areas of interest/control are useless in these bodies..
But perhaps the lines of crossover are too blurred which makes
seeing effective working practices hard to see...<br>
<br>
<br>
Mal (VK2XFW)<br>
<div>
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On 18/02/2014 4:46 PM, Geordie Guy wrote:<br>
</div></div></div><div><div class="h5">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Why don't we keep the ACCC and get rid of ACMA? </div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 1:01 PM,
Narelle <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:narellec@gmail.com" target="_blank">narellec@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal">Opinion in CommsDay today comes out
swinging against the
ACCC and some of the pillars of Australia’s competition
regulation. “[T]he time
may have come for the ACCC to vacate its role as the de
facto comptroller and
consigliere for the Australian telecommunications
industry”.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">What would this mean for ACMA? Comms
Day may be reading the govt correctly, they may be not.<br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">
<br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thoughts?<br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Narelle</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">From Comms Day today<br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">COMMENT BY GRAHAME LYNCH</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>Is a new 2014 Telecommunications
Act in the offing?</b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Is the Federal government gearing up
for the most
far-reaching overhaul of telecommunications legislation</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and regulation in seventeen years—in
effect, a new 2014
Telecommunications Act that replaces</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the 1997 act and the
telecommunications sections of trade
practices legislation?</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">That’s certainly the implication of
the messaging coming out
of Canberra over the past few days.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">EXHIBIT A: Parliamentary secretary
Paul Fletcher told
parliament last week “the current regulatory</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">framework is fundamentally based on a
1990s world of
relatively stable technologies and business</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">models which placed great emphasis on
the predominance of
the fixed-line network—which was certainly</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">a valid assumption at the time. Since
that time, of course,
there has been a steady accretion of</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">layer upon layer of rules and
regulations. Some of these
rules and regulations are important for facilitating</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">competition but others are not of
such evident value in
2014. It is timely to ask whether the</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">policy objectives underpinning
particular regulatory
measures in the communications sector remain</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">valid; if they do not, the case for
those regulations being
retained is very difficult to see.”</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">EXHIBIT B: The “framing” paper for
the NBN cost-benefit
review released last Thursday night reads</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">less like a slight calibration of the
status quo and more
like the type of paper one would release if one</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">was contemplating a complete
“re-boot” of the entire policy
and legislative assumptions that underpin</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the Australian telecommunications
sector. It states that
“Australia is unusual in vesting responsibility</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">for economic regulation of
telecommunications in a
generalist body whose responsibilities include</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">administration of the competition
laws.”</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">“Originally, the decision to transfer
those powers to the
ACCC was based on the view that telecommunications-
specific provisions would merge over time into the
national
access regime established under Part IIIA of then Trade
Practices Act. However, no
such confluence has occurred nor</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">seems likely to occur, though it may
well be that some
aspects of the current telecommunications provisions
will eventually be substantially streamlined. In the
light
of those considerations, and of the</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">broader factors determining the
efficient allocation of
functions in a regulatory system, the panel</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">would welcome views on whether the
current allocation of
responsibilities should remain or alternatively,</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">what alternative approach would be
preferable.”</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">EXHIBIT C: The same framing paper
invites a complete
“re-think” on the assumptions underlying</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the NBN policy, which, of course, was
the end-point of the
open access debate and policy evolution</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">that began in earnest as long ago as
2001 and accelerated in
2005 under Telstra’s plea for regulatory</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">relief so it could build an FTTN
network. Among the issues
on the table: should the NBN refrain</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">from overbuild of privately held
networks that can achieve
NBN-level functionalities, should retail</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">service providers be able to buy
equity in NBN Co, how
should cross-subsidies for loss making services</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">be best provided and most
significantly, “What broader
structural model or models for the industry</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">should the panel consider”?</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The corridors of power now host
alternative intellectual
viewpoints to the access seeker-driven</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">"victim mentality" agenda that has
dominated
Australian telecom policy for a decade.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The failure of the ACCC to adopt a
consistent regulatory
approach that would provide predictability</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and certainty for telecommunications
network investors has
been well catalogued, especially in this</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">journal, but the regulator persists,
oblivious to criticism.
Now taxpayers are potentially exposed to upwards of tens
of billions of dollars of liability simply so that
My Little ISP Pty Ltd can theoretically</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">play in the same league as Telstra
and SingTel.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">From 2002 or so, the ACCC acted as if
making access seekers
more reliant on below-cost access to</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Telstra’s network would somehow
reduce Telstra’s dominance,
seemingly blind to the obvious endpoint</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">that the investment impasse this
spawned provided limited
short term benefits to some citizens</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">as consumers (the million or two who
took a slightly cheaper
Telstra-sourced, access-seeker resold</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">broadband service in urban areas) and
a medium to long term
cost to all citizens as taxpayers (who are</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">exposed to the risk of the 100%
government subsidised NBN
and are compelled to out lay tens of billions of dollars
of compensation to big
bad Telstra).</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">On one hand we had the ACCC denying
that it priced access
too low, even when at the same time</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">its own explanatory documents were
affirming that it
employed pricing methodologies such as “retail minus’ on
already price capped retail services precisely because
they delivered the lowest price outcome.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">At the same time, it constantly
shifted the methodology goal
posts, repeatedly deferring costs to</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">a future which would never arrive: a
so-called “tilted annuity”
designed to reward access seekers with</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">short term prices well below their
sustainable cost. A
decade on, the ACCC’s cost models even now</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">only allow Telstra to recover costs
at a monthly rate of
between $16 (ULL Band 2) and $24 (ADSL</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Wholesale) per line when the copper
network’s actual
replacement network in the form of the NBN</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">has estimated it needed to earn $32
by as soon as next year
and above $50 within five years to meet</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">its own (likely over optimistic in
itself) business plan.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">This ongoing intellectual fraud
persisted because of a
policy environment where a spectacularly</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">well-organised and articulate access
seeker lobby
successfully equated their own interests with the</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">“public interest” and created a sense
of constant crisis
about the regulatory regime and Telstra’s</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">“dominance.” Concerns over Telstra’s
dominance and likely
behaviour under privatisation also led to</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">a succession of regulations governing
its service and
connection levels, at a potential cost of a billion</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">or more dollars relative to benefits.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The fact that the vast majority of
Telstra access seekers
and ISPs whose business formation was inspired by the
1997 reforms have sold out or merged for collective
hundreds of millions of dollars in</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">shareholder return—nearly 20 such
entities bought by iiNet
alone—demonstrates how over-egged this</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">sense of perpetual grievance and
crisis was. Ditto, the
nationalisation of fixed network capital investment</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and deal to provide tens of billions
of dollars of NBN
compensation to Telstra has correlated</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">with a near doubling of Telstra’s
share price since 2010. So
much for crimping the 600 pound gorilla.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">As Malcolm Turnbull memorably
described it, one senses a
conspiracy against the taxpayer.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">1997 ASSUMPTIONS CHANGE: Indeed,
developments over the last
17 years have left behind the</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">best intentions of the 1997
Telecommunications Act. One
obvious change was the rise of broadband,</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">fuelled by the emergence of cheap
Chinese-made DSLAMs, and
the sea change this created in the</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">layers where value is created over
telecommunications
networks—that is, not just through end user</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">access charges, but through
over-the-top services and
serving facilities in data centres.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Another was the rise of mobile tech
to dominance and its
ability to offer substitutes to almost every</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">monetisable service hitherto
monopolised by the fixed
network. Stephen Conroy, his advisers, bureaucrats</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and industry supporters, were
unfortunately so blindsided by
fixed access seeker and then</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">FTTH lobby rhetoric that they failed
to react to these
developments, committing ever more public</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">policy attention and resource to the
apparently vexing but
increasingly receding priority of vertical</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">integration and retail dominance in
the fixed network access
market.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Now the writing is on the wall for
these decade-old
homilies. The new government appears determined</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">to deliver on red tape reduction in a
way its predecessors
under Rudd, Gillard and Howard</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">did not—and the vast, unwieldy
pot-pourri of 20th century
telecommunications legislation seems ripe</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">for dismantling. One of the chief
dissenters from the
received wisdom over the past decade, Professor</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Henry Ergas, now sits on the panel
charged with providing
primary advice to government on what</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">new approach it should adopt,
alongside some interesting
characters such as Alison Deans, who, as a</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">former Ebay executive, presumably
brings a nuanced view of
the interplay between OTT, access, fixed</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and mobile in the telecommunications
ecosystem.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The new panel has already overtly
signalled that the time
may have come for the ACCC to vacate</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">its role as the de facto comptroller
and consigliere for the
Australian telecommunications industry.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Almost certainly the emphasis will be
on compelling telecom
operators—and the private sector more</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">generally—to take on more of the
risk, heavy lifting and
reward in building and delivering next generation</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">services. Lest this be seen as a
fool’s errand it should be
revealed that Telstra CEO David Thodey</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and a representative of Optus’
ultimate owner Temasek are
meeting with Federal Treasurer Joe Hockey</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">later this week to discuss how to
unlock private sector
capital for infrastructure investment. Legislative</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and regulatory incentives—and
disincentives– will almost
certainly be a topic for discussion.</p>
<span><font color="#888888"><br clear="all">
<br>
-- <br>
<br>
<br>
Narelle Clark<br>
<a href="mailto:president@isoc-au.org.au" target="_blank">president@isoc-au.org.au</a><br>
<a href="mailto:narellec@gmail.com" target="_blank">narellec@gmail.com</a>
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