<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div>An ad hominem response from an anonymous account?</div><div><br></div><div>You stay classy, "Geordie Guy."</div><div><br>On 8 Nov 2013, at 14:32, Geordie Guy <<a href="mailto:elomis@gmail.com">elomis@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr">Oh wait I just looked you up on LinkedIn. Nevermind.<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 8, 2013 at 2:26 PM, Geordie Guy <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:elomis@gmail.com" target="_blank">elomis@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Gross overreaction? I'm curious to hear more about how a national scale warrantless surveillance system, the bugging of the phone of foreign heads of state and the hacking of some of the Internet's most important company's datacenter interconnects doesn't warrant encryption. What do you think would've been an appropriate response? No ice cream after dinner and straight to bed?<br>
</div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 8, 2013 at 2:20 PM, Dobbins, Roland <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:rdobbins@arbor.net" target="_blank">rdobbins@arbor.net</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><br>
On Nov 8, 2013, at 10:11 AM, Mark Newton <<a href="mailto:newton@atdot.dotat.org" target="_blank">newton@atdot.dotat.org</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
> I can't say I'm disappointed in this resolution. Should have happened a long time ago.<br>
<br>
</div>The problem with overencryption of this magnitude is that besides the additional overhead, it makes dealing with DDoS attacks and other security issues considerably more difficult in terms of detection, classification, traceback, and mitigation, not to mention broadening the attack surface and providing a non-insignficant impact amplification, due to crypto overhead.<br>
<br>
On top of that, it's useless - the spooks and spies (not to mention the ODCs) simply bypass it all and get everything en clair from the endpoints themselves.<br>
<br>
This is a bad move; a gross over-reaction that, if implemented (which I doubt it will be), will degrade the overall security posture of the Internet to a significant degree.<br>
<br>
There are no technical solutions to social ills. If this comes to pass, we will all regret it.<br>
<br>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
Roland Dobbins <<a href="mailto:rdobbins@arbor.net" target="_blank">rdobbins@arbor.net</a>> // <<a href="http://www.arbornetworks.com" target="_blank">http://www.arbornetworks.com</a>><br>
<br>
Luck is the residue of opportunity and design.<br>
<br>
-- John Milton<br>
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