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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I think that as always there is a need
for balance.<br>
ENCRYPT ALL THE THINGS! is going to cause problems particularly as
far as caching and any other form of "legitimate" snooping.<br>
I feel that as a % the volume of traffic that would benefit from
encryption is low. <br>
IE encrypt your VoIP call, not so much the cat videos.<br>
<br>
Perhaps more focus needs to be put on advertising to legit
snooping boxes the data they need to do said snooping, and if
perhaps they can do that snooping *without* spying on the
*content* then so much the better.<br>
IE encrypt content by default, but leave the ability to declare
some elements as plain text or with some form of unique ID that
lets things cache and proxy perhaps even better than before. IE
you could plausibly cache bit torrent style traffic by storing a
uuid and md5 (say) for each block without actually knowing what
was in said block.<br>
<br>
If wiretap style snooping is your pet bugbear then encrypt the
network link itself, not necessarily the traffic going over it. If
you transparently encrypted all the data as it went over the wire,
then inside your switch decrypt it, and recrypt it as it goes onto
its next hop that would really put a spanner in their works.<br>
<br>
That said I figure *most* of the important traffic these days
would already be encrypted and the wiretap is mostly going to be
giving meta information, IE who is talking to whom and how much.
The decrypted info would I imagine mostly be coming from
compromised end points (a task made vastly easier with meta
information about your target)<br>
On 8/11/2013 5:56 PM, David Miller wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:527C8B11.9010407@tiggee.com" type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
On 11/7/2013 11:55 PM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
On Nov 8, 2013, at 11:06 AM, David Miller <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:dmiller@tiggee.com"><dmiller@tiggee.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Perhaps, given the current state of DDoS mitigation hardware. Build better boxes.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
It has nothing to do with building better boxes. How precisely does one use flow-telemetry to detect, say, a SYN-flood inside an encrypted tunnel?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
A SYN-flood inside an encrypted tunnel? You can't use flow-telemety to
detect that from a node that does not participate in the encryption.
You also can't listen in on a VoIP call with a butt set and alligator clips.
If your argument is "Everything must be in the clear or we can't stop
the bad guys.", then you probably won't find a lot of support for that
position.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">And flow telemetry is the only way to do that sort of thing at any kind of scale.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
The only way right now. Arbor has a lot of smart folks. I have faith
in you to find a solution. :-)
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">And adding more boxes with more copies of keys and certs is in and of itself a vast expansion of the attack surface (most cryptosystems are actually broken via implementation miscues and side-channel attacks).
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
A solvable issue - see any organization with a large base of
infrastructure (that doesn't fall over regularly - I'm not saying that
everyone has solved it, just that it can be solved).
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I don't buy that.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Whether you 'buy' it or not, it's already happening.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Clearly they were getting some data from the endpoints, and clearly they
weren't getting everything they wanted from the endpoints. Thus they
were/are groping inter-DC traffic from some organizations that we know
were providing data (of some sort) from their endpoints.
Your stated that encryption is "useless - the spooks and spies (not to
mention the ODCs) simply bypass it all and get everything en clair from
the endpoints themselves" and I disagree.
'data from endpoints' and 'snooping fiber' are *both* "already
happening". If your contention that they can get all they want from the
endpoints were true, then they wouldn't have needed to snoop fiber (not
snooping fiber would have been even cheaper and easier).
I will also point out that we now know that the NSA (and likely other
agencies of the same ilk) deliberately weakened some crypto. If crypto
were useless, then why weaken it?
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> If they could have simply bypassed it all and gotten everything from the endpoints, then why were/are they groping inter-DC traffic and longhaul fiber?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Because it's cheaper and easier to do mass surveillance via the network links, obviously.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Obviously, I am all for more expensive and harder.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">But, since we're talking about governments, they've nearly in
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Now that the curtains has been pulled back, I expect to see a large amount of pushback from individuals and from those organizations that manage
said "endpoints".
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
It won't matter, unless the issues are resolved at the political level.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
There is, without a doubt, a political component to a "resolution"
(given some definition of "resolution"). However, I think that most
people in the world are now well beyond "trusting" that there would not
be future abuses, regardless of any political wrangling that may occur.
Political solutions have a limited area of influence. Even if the US
passed new laws to restrict monitoring; that wouldn't affect data
collection abuses anywhere else (Great Britain, Germany, France, China,
Russia, North Korea, Syria, Iran, etc., etc.). Despite Chancellor
Merkel's faux righteous indignation, BND is monitoring fiber and IXes
just like the NSA (reportedly under a letter that she herself signed).
Suppose that all nations of the world agreed not to collect data without
probable cause and judicial oversight, would anyone "trust" that?
Pretty much all the nations of the world agreed a long time ago that
torture should not happen and yet we had extraordinary rendition.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">What? Nobody who sells products or services on the internet would want to do away with HTTPS.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Strawman. I never proposed doing away with HTTP/S for things like credit card numbers, personal information, VPNs, and whatnot.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
No. You just seem to be proposing that any other data that I might pass
over the internet is not important and does not need to be protected in
any manner -and- that protocols not be expanded to even give me the
option of protecting data that I might want to keep private in flight.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> Encryption is already available in a large number of services without yet degrading the overall security posture of
the internet.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
The vast majority of Internet traffic is unencrypted.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Quite true, now. The IETF consensus is, unless I missed the point, that
encryption needs to be worked into existing protocols and
required/strongly suggested in any new protocols. This would lead, if I
am understanding the direction of this, to less unencrypted traffic.
I imagine this will end up more like STARTTLS in SMTP and less like
encrypted tunnels with amorphous endpoints everywhere that could contain
SYN-floods. But, we will see how it develops.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">There have been throughout history, many many technical solutions to social ills.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
I suspect we have differing definitions of 'social ills'.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Perhaps you could provide your definition of 'social ills', so we can
both use the same definition.
-DMM
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rdobbins@arbor.net"><rdobbins@arbor.net></a> // <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.arbornetworks.com"><http://www.arbornetworks.com></a>
Luck is the residue of opportunity and design.
-- John Milton
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