<div dir="ltr">I love this mute button, <br><br>Thanks Angelo!<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On 12 July 2013 15:14, Narelle <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:narellec@gmail.com" target="_blank">narellec@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">
<p>[From todays Crikey..]</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Telstra was compelled to strike a secret 2001 deal with the
FBI and the US Department of Justice to give them surveillance access to the
undersea cables owned by its subsidiary Reach, a new document released online
and provided to Crikey reveals.</p>
<p>The document shows Telstra, at that stage majority-owned by
the Howard government, and its partner Pacific Century Cyber Works (now PCCW),
then controlled by Hong Kong businessman Richard Li, agreed to provide the FBI
with around-the-clock access to Reach's cables to spy on communications going
into and out of the United States. It is signed by Telstra's then-company
secretary Douglas Gration, then-deputy assistant US attorney-general John G.
Malcolm, Alex Arena of PCCW, Alistair Grieve of Reach and Larry R. Parkinson of
the FBI.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>Reach, headquartered in Hong Kong, is said to control more
than 40 major telecommunications cables going into and out of the Asia-Pacific,
including cables into and from China and Australia.</p>
<p>Claiming that "US communications systems are essential
to the ability of the US government to fulfill its responsibilities to the
public to preserve the national security of the United States, to enforce the
laws, and to maintain the safety of the public", the agreement places a
number of requirements on Reach, Telstra and PCCW:</p>
<p>
All customer billing data to be stored for two years;</p>
<p>
Ability to provide to agencies any stored telecommunications or internet
communications and comply with preservation requests;</p>
<p>
Ability to provide any stored meta-data, billing data or subscriber information
about US customers;</p>
<p>
They are not to comply with any foreign privacy laws that might lead to
mandatory destruction of stored data;</p>
<p>
Plans and infrastructure to demonstrate other states cannot spy on US
customers;</p>
<p>
They are not to comply with information requests from other countries without
DoJ permission;</p>
<p>
A requirement to:</p>
<p>"... designate points of contact within the United
States with the authority and responsibility for accepting and overseeing the
carrying out of Lawful US Process to conduct Electronic Surveillance of or
relating to Domestic Communications carried by or through Domestic
Communications Infrastructure; or relating to customers or subscribers of
Domestic Communications Companies. The points of contact shall be assigned to
Domestic Communications Companies security office(s) in the United States,
shall be available twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week and
shall be responsible for accepting service and maintaining the security of
Classified Information and any Lawful US Process for Electronic Surveillance
... The Points of contact shall be resident US citizens who are eligible for US
security clearances...";</p>
<p>
A requirement to keep such surveillance confidential, and to use US citizens
"who meet high standards of trustworthiness for maintaining the
confidentiality of Sensitive Information" to handle requests;</p>
<p>
A right for the FBI and the DoJ to conduct inspection visits of the companies'
infrastructure and offices; and</p>
<p>
An annual compliance report, to be protected from Freedom of Information
requests.</p>
<p>The US is able to impose the agreements even on offshore
companies because of Federal Communications Commission licensing requirements
for the provision of telecommunications services into and out of the US, which
can be made subject to conditions relating to national security and law
enforcement.</p>
<p>It's important to note that "Domestic
Communications" in the agreement means the "US portion" of
communications that originate or terminate in the United States, although
"portion" isn't defined and could extend to all communication on
infrastructure physically located in the US, which would in practice mean all
communication going into or out of or through the US. Moreover, surveillance
can also be conducted "relating" to customers or subscribers, regardless
of where the relevant communication is.</p>
<p>A Telstra spokesman told Crikey "this Agreement, at
that time 12 years ago, reflected Reach's operating obligations in the US that
require carriers to comply with US domestic law."</p>
<p>The existence of such agreements with cable owners was
revealed by The Washington Post last weekend in the wake of revelations about
the extent of FBI, National Security Agency and other US government internet
and phone surveillance. On Tuesday, a long list of such agreements, complete
with the documents, was published by the Public Intelligence website, covering
the period from 1999 through to 2011 and a variety of cable owners from Europe,
the Americas and Asia. The web of agreements ensures agencies such as the FBI
can access all internet and telephone communications going into and out of the
US for surveillance purposes.</p><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><span><font color="#888888">
</font></span></font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
</font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br><br><br>Narelle<br><a href="mailto:narellec@gmail.com" target="_blank">narellec@gmail.com</a>
</font></span></div>
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