[AusNOG] More legislative interventions
andy at coastalaudio.com.au
andy at coastalaudio.com.au
Wed Apr 10 12:35:08 EST 2019
Some interesting stuff here:
https://towardsdatascience.com/real-time-and-video-processing-object-detection-using-tensorflow-opencv-and-docker-2be1694726e5
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cognitive-services/face/face-api-how-to-topics/howtoanalyzevideo_face
“If our analysis consisted of a lightweight client-side algorithm, this approach would be suitable. However, when analysis happens in the cloud, the latency involved means that an API call might take several seconds. During this time, we are not capturing images, and our thread is essentially doing nothing. Our maximum frame-rate is limited by the latency of the API calls.”
Food for thought – this mythical “real-time” analyses is possible, but incredibly expensive to implement, as I’ve stated repeatedly…who will pick up the cost? The onus should be on the Government to develop a universal tool and assist providers with the infrastructure for implementation…unlikely given that it’s ostensibly broke…
Andy
From: AusNOG <ausnog-bounces at lists.ausnog.net> On Behalf Of Paul Wilkins
Sent: Wednesday, 10 April 2019 12:00 PM
To: ausnog at lists.ausnog.net
Subject: Re: [AusNOG] More legislative interventions
1 - Remove specified file based content and similar copies - doable, and reckless if not actioned by hosting providers.
2 - Proactively remove unspecified content of abhorrent violent nature - difficult, not reliable, and moot whether required under the legislation for hosting providers. Arguably sets a standard above recklessness for hosting providers. Likely required under the act for social media but not for hosting providers. Make it a condition of terms of use, and the issue goes away, imo.
I am not a lawyer. This is not expert advice.
Kind regards
Paul Wilkins
On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 11:55, Scott Wilson <siridar at gmail.com <mailto:siridar at gmail.com> > wrote:
I feel like legislation will compel tech companies to implement human screening in some capacity, and there will be huge downsides to that - I mean, which is more likely:
a) screening team members are offered abundant mental health support resources, given follow-through on reporting (that video you flagged last year resulted in a conviction and a jail sentence, congratulations!) and are limited to short periods...
or:
b) screening team members are a minimum wage disposable/contractor/gig economy workforce, desperate for any income, performance tracked to the extreme (we require 55 minutes of video content viewed per hour) and discarded when they inevitably burn out?
On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 11:45, Nick Stallman <nick at agentpoint.com <mailto:nick at agentpoint.com> > wrote:
I didn't know Tineye could tell if an image was violent or not.
The existing systems work for copyright purposes, finding a similar match.
This works to some extent currently, and can handle recompression,
scaling, etc...
It falls apart when an adversary wants to get around it however.
But for the case that this legislation is targeting, i.e. taking down
violent video, fingerprinting is useless.
It's brand new content - completely impossible to detect in advance.
You can only remove the content after it's been distributed for quite
some time, not pre-emptively which is what the politicians want.
On 10/4/19 11:16 am, Paul Wilkins wrote:
> https://tineye.com/search/f274c3b49edcca9a6d83994a43629445a5ea5a23/
>
> On Wed, 10 Apr 2019 at 11:12, Matt Palmer <mpalmer at hezmatt.org <mailto:mpalmer at hezmatt.org>
> <mailto:mpalmer at hezmatt.org <mailto:mpalmer at hezmatt.org> >> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:56:12AM +1000, Paul Wilkins wrote:
> > Now I would say that for instance, if the eSecurity Director
> posts the CRC
> > of a file as being "abhorrent violent" content, and your company
> doesn't
> > expeditiously take down that material, expect problems down the
> pike. I
> > doubt a CRC check alone is sufficient.
>
> Given that a CRC changes if you modify any bit of the file, and
> common CRC
> implementations have a space of either 16 or 32 bits (65,536 and
> ~4 billion
> possible values, respectively), "insufficient" doesn't even begin to
> describe such a scheme.
>
> > I'd say a fingerprinting system to
> > match altered copies of the subject file should be implemented.
>
> Once again with this magical "figerprinting" scheme. Nothing like
> what
> you're describing actually exists. Further, there's no point in each
> company coming up with their own scheme for calculating this magical
> fingerprint, because if the eSecurity Director wants to say "take down
> everything like this fingerprint" they have to use the *same*
> scheme to come
> up with the same fingerprint.
>
> > It doesn't have to work in all cases.
>
> It won't work in *any* case.
>
> > I am not a lawyer. This is not expert advice.
>
> Yes, I think that is quite evident.
>
> - Matt
>
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