[AusNOG] Assistance and Access Bill moves to PJCIS

Paul Brooks pbrooks-ausnog at layer10.com.au
Tue Nov 20 09:29:19 EST 2018


I had a fairly long session in front of the PJCIS hearing on Friday afternoon. The
audio stream isn't up on APH yet, but theres been a few articles in the IT media.

https://www.zdnet.com/article/no-need-to-keep-encryption-busting-capabilities-secret-internet-australia/
https://www.itwire.com/government-tech-policy/85302-encryption-bill-problems-due-to-secret-drafting,-says-ia.html

There are two more hearings, both in Canberra scheduled 27th and 30th November. They
should be livestreamed with video, while this Sydney hearing was only audio.

There are more submissions rolling in and being published almost daily, despite the
formal submissions period being 'closed'. If you'd like to tell the PJCIS what you
think, they will still accept and publish submissions -
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/TelcoAmendmentBill2018/Submissions

One of the latest (#85) is from Senatas, an Australian manufacturer and vendor of
network encryption security devices, warning of economic damage to Australia's IT
export industry.

Paul (wearing hat as Chair, Internet Australia)




On 18/11/2018 11:45 AM, Paul Wilkins wrote:
> This list was intended to highlight salient concerns, and not as a summary of the
> areas of real concern. A more complete summary of concerns would look more like:
>
> 1 - Why is there no judicial oversite of these sweeping police powers?
> 2 - Scope of powers go beyond terrorism and serious crime when it's not supposed to.
> 3 - It supports the establishment of the machinery of mass surveillance when it's
> not supposed to.
> 4 - It weakens the Internet's security, when it's not supposed to.
> 5 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are necessary and
> proportionate to the human right to privacy, unrevokeable per the Declaration of
> Human Rights.
> 6 - Why the deliberate exclusion/incompatibility of the provisions of the Privacy
> Act 1988?
> 7 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are necessary and
> proportionate to service providers rights private property, unrevokeable per the
> Declaration of Human Rights.
> 8 - When Police Powers lie with the States, what constitutional head of power
> supports the Bill's  scope, without enabling legislation from the States conferring
> power? The Constitution confers national security powers, but the scope of the
> Bill's police powers exceeds this remit.
> 9 - Why has the Bill overlooked the obvious alternative of powers spread across a
> dozen Law Enforcement Agencies, which is to centralise in one single agency,
> providing for greater data security, governance, efficiency, and accountability.
> 10 - Why the lack of provisions for accountability for the exercise of police
> powers, and checks and balances commensurate to the reach of sweeping police powers,
> quite incompatible with the democratic institutions and traditions of Liberal Democracy?
> 11 - Why the deliberately curtailed public consultation process and attempt to
> ambush both the public and government with this Bill by Dep't Home Affairs, and
> representations of public and industry consultations as being timely and adequate,
> incompatible with the facts on the public record and the express concerns of the
> public, human rights groups, and industry?
> 12 - Why the absence of recompense for injury to reputation or to service providers'
> business, or other injury consequent to police malfeasance or misfeasance? The
> Bill's protections are not comprehensive, and where they make provision, go only as
> far as to establish lack of liability for unlawful disclosures.
> 13 - Why has the government of the day referred this deeply flawed Bill to the
> PJCIS, PJCHR, and the SSCSB, for review wasting public time and money, rather than
> sending it back to Dep't Home Affairs for a complete overhaul of it's scope and
> objectives?
>
> Kind regards
>
> Paul Wilkins
>
> On Sat, 17 Nov 2018 at 13:10, Paul Wilkins <paulwilkins369 at gmail.com
> <mailto:paulwilkins369 at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     These are all good points.
>
>     Home Affairs put up this Bill on the premise it's needed to fight terrorism and
>     serious crime in the context of increasing use of encryption. Unfortunately,
>     this isn't that bill.
>
>     Home Affairs seem rather uninterested in explaining why the remit of this Bill
>     goes well beyond this:
>
>     1 - Why is there no judicial oversite of these sweeping police powers?
>     2 - Scope of powers go beyond terrorism and serious crime when it's not supposed to.
>     3 - It supports the establishment of the machinery of mass surveillance when
>     it's not supposed to.
>     4 - It weakens the Internet's security, when it's not supposed to.
>     5 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are necessary and
>     proportionate to the human right to privacy, unrevokeable per the Declaration of
>     Human Rights.
>     6 - Why are there no limits to ensure issue of TCNs/TANs/TARs are necessary and
>     proportionate to service providers rights private property, unrevokeable per the
>     Declaration of Human Rights.
>
>     Unfortunately the way the Bill's drafted, the only limit on the use of the
>     Bill's powers is the Dep't Home Affairs.
>
>     There's also the very interesting constitutional question, how, when Police
>     Powers lie with the States, what constitutional head of power supports the
>     Bill's scope, without enabling legislation from the States conferring power.
>
>     Kind regards
>
>     Paul Wilkins
>
>     On Sat, 17 Nov 2018 at 10:34, Scott Weeks <surfer at mauigateway.com
>     <mailto:surfer at mauigateway.com>> wrote:
>
>
>
>         It's still Friday here, so I am looking like I'm working
>         while reading these posts as I only have an hour and a
>         half to go before happy hour starts...  ;-)
>
>
>         --- christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au <mailto:christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au> wrote:
>         From: Christian Heinrich <christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au
>         <mailto:christian.heinrich at cmlh.id.au>>
>
>         Also
>         https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/are-encrypted-phones-allowing-criminals-to-get-away-with-murder-20150523-gh82gv.html
>         which was 55 devices and 800 clients.
>
>         Therefore the TAC et al are overkill within the context of the
>         Australian population of 25,000,000+
>         ------------------------------------------------
>
>         This is a joke.  Right? 
>
>         "...with the devices being used to arrange at least two recent
>         murders and hampered investigations into at least two others."
>
>         "Phantom Secure...enables messages to be sent and ledgers kept
>         on a device which investigators cannot crack or intercept."
>
>         "...we are confident we can erode their impact."
>
>         So if the criminals used postal mail to arrange those crimes
>         and sent ledgers in the postal mail, would they say 'we have
>         to be able to read every postal mail' to erode their impact
>         and ensure safety and national security???  And, 4 crimes
>         happened on a cell phone that's encrypted, so we need to be
>         able to read the contents of 25 million+ cell phones whenever
>         we want.  Just in case. 
>
>
>         "...representatives from the NSW Police have travelled to
>         BlackBerry's headquarters in Canada in a bid to get advice
>         on how to retrieve information from the encrypted devices."
>
>         Wow, a free trip to Canada because they can't do phone calls
>         of internet video conferencing?  Something stinks!
>
>
>         ======================================
>
>
>         http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-04/queensland-fraud-squad-raised-$800k-three-years-project-synergy/8858852
>
>         "Earlier this year the ABC lodged a right to information
>         application for documents outlining how much money had
>         been raised by Project Synergy.
>
>         It was refused by Queensland Police."
>
>         "The QPS has told the ABC that money raised was used for
>         training, cyber-safety programs and fraud awareness."
>
>         BWAHAHAHAHA!  No we're not going to tell you how we spent
>         tons of money we shouldn't have spent.  (Maybe for fun on
>         the Canada trip?)
>
>         "...including some questionable items such as wine
>         coolers for a children's program".
>
>         Further, we're going to get the kids drunk, so they won't
>         either.
>
>         >:-)   <= evil grin
>
>         scott
>
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